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Preface
This dissertation consists of three chapters that employ economic experiments as a
method. All three chapters of this dissertation are self-contained and include their own
introductions and appendices such that they can be read independently. The respective
appendices contain the relevant supplementary material.
A famous quote from an economics textbook (Samuelson and Nordhaus, 1985) is “One
possible way of figuring out economic laws ... is by controlled experiments. ... Economists
(unfortunately) ... cannot perform the controlled experiments of chemists or biologists
because they cannot easily control other important factors. Like astronomers or meteo-
rologists, they generally must be content largely to observe.”. This attitude has changed
in the meantime. Experiments in economics are an established tool to answer questions
which are otherwise hard to answer, because the researcher cannot obtain the relevant
data or the data simply does not exist. The former, for example, is the case for trader char-
acteristics in a financial market, while the latter is a frequent problem when economists
consult politicians or companies. It is not always possible to deliver clear-cut predictions
for new auction mechanism designs. So economic experiments serve as a wind tunnel to
test new approaches before they are actually implemented.
Roth (1986) defines a general taxonomy to distinguish the reasons for economic experi-
ments. The first category is “Speaking to Theorists”, which describes experiments con-
ducted to test and refine economic theories. The second category is “Whispering into the
Ears of Princes”, and contains experiments directly related to policy advice. The final
category essentially catches all experiments that do not fit into one of the previous cat-
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egories. It is called “Searching for Facts” and has an exploratory focus. Its experiments
try to gather data that deliver new insights into general economic questions. The three
categories are not mutually exclusive. They are also not collectively exhaustive, although
the bulk of economic experiments can be sorted into at least one of these categories.
The desirability of experiments comes from the fact that the researcher can control almost
everything in such experiments. It may well be the case that the researcher does not regard
all important factors in the development of a design or in the analysis of his results. But
this can be changed for virtually all variables. As the experimenter controls the design and
the participants of the experiment, he also has the potential to optimize all dimensions
of the experiment, such that he can cleanly answer his research question. In this sense,
economic experiments are very close to the experiments of chemists and other natural
scientists.
While laboratory experiments were the main tool of analysis for most of the time, this
has changed in recent years. Economists nowadays frequently conduct “field experiments”
(Harrison and List, 2004). These are experiments, which change the established charac-
teristics of laboratory experiments in order to obtain conclusions that are more robust
than the conclusions from usual laboratory experiments. John List, a leading field exper-
imenter from the University of Chicago, compares the usual lab setting to a clean test
tube. But he is of the opinion that a dirty test tube can actually be preferable. “When
the test tube is dirty, it means that it’s harder to make proper causal inference by using
our typical empirical approaches that model mounds and mounds of data.”1 This view is
shared by many other researchers, so that field experiments have become an additional
method to conduct economic experiments.
A step in between laboratory and field experiments are Internet experiments. Not all of
them add field context, change the subject pool or use subjects unaware of the experi-
ment. In some cases, Internet experiments are simply conducted in order to maximize
1Interview in a publication of the Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond
http://www.richmondfed.org/publications/research/region_focus/2012/q2-3/pdf/interview.
pdf
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the number of participants. The first chapter of this thesis is a methodological analysis.
It is based on joint work with Ben Greiner (UNSW Sydney) and Anthony Ziegelmeyer
(Queen’s University Belfast). It tries to answer the question, to which extent data gener-
ated in Internet experiments is similar to data generated in laboratory experiments. We
implement an established payment scheme of the laboratory in the Internet and com-
pare the participants’ choices in lottery tasks to the choices of participants in auxiliary
laboratory experiments. This payment scheme is called the random incentive system
(RIS) (Baltussen et al., 2012) and its main feature is that only a subset of participants
or decisions of a participant are actually paid out.
We discuss the results from this Internet experiment which aims to elicit the risk pref-
erences of about 3,500 participants in the same way as Holt and Laury (2002) (HL) did
in the laboratory. Only a subset of five of the Internet participants is paid for one out
of ten choices. We compare the results to results from the laboratory treatments which
implement a similar decision task but provide much higher probabilities of being paid.
Specifically, in one laboratory treatment we use the same stakes as in the Internet, but a
participant selection probability of 1/15, while in another treatment we divide the stakes
by 5, but pay 1/3 of participants according to one of their ten choices.
Our main result is that our Internet setting with an RIS elicits the same risk preferences
through HL tables as a laboratory experiment with usual laboratory payment. This is
the case although we implement an ambiguous probability of being selected for payoff.
We find no differences between the risk preferences elicited in our main laboratory treat-
ment and in the Internet treatment, which had higher stakes. However, we observe more
inconsistencies in our Internet data than in our lab data.
The second chapter of this thesis is also an Internet experiment but does not ask a
methodological question. It contributes to the literature on prediction markets. It is
also based on joint work with Ben Greiner (UNSW Sydney) and Anthony Ziegelmeyer
(Queen’s University Belfast). Our markets were set up during the 2006 FIFA Soccer World
Cup. The uncertain events to be predicted were the outcome of each of the matches.
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Each match had one independent market. We introduce the distinction between the
(theoretical) equilibrium price and the (empirical) final price of a market. With our
dataset of risk aversion, beliefs, and final prediction market prices we can compare the
mean belief, the equilibrium price, and the final price on a market.
Our results support the prevalent notion of no relevant differences between mean belief
and equilibrium price. Furthermore, our final prices exhibit a considerable difference
to the equilibrium prices. Additionally, in our markets, the final prices are the worst
predictive statistics and are outperformed by the mean belief. Our contribution to the
literature is the distinction between final and equilibrium price as well as the comparison
of the predictive power of mean belief, equilibrium price, and final price.
Finding out how prices on prediction markets are generated not only helps us to discover
how prediction markets work. Through the similarity of prediction markets to regular
double auction markets, analyzing these markets also aids our understanding of market
price formation in general. Prediction markets have the advantage of richer datasets on
traders and prices as usual financial markets. They also reveal the fundamental value of a
contract at a certain point of time in contrast to many assets on regular financial markets.
Our experiment is the first study to analyze the interplay of risk aversion and beliefs with
the aid of data elicited from human traders. We set up prediction markets which give us
final prices to analyze. Additionally, we elicited the participants’ risk aversion and beliefs.
All other studies of the related strand of literature either relied on theoretical analyses or
used (partly) artificially created datasets. Data created in actual prediction markets was
never used in more but a supplementary way in this strand of literature. Furthermore,
no study so far analyzes a dataset as exhaustive as ours.
The last chapter is a field experiment with the focus on a relative payment scheme and
the channels through which such a scheme might yield employee collusion. It is based on
joint work with Alain Cohn, Ernst Fehr, and Michel Maréchal (all three of them at the
University of Zurich). Relative payment schemes are a useful tool to reward workers. The
4
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company knows its expenditures before the actual payment and is unaffected by positive
production shocks. The worker in turn is unaffected by negative production shocks. But
he is paid through a payment scheme, which is usually met with discomfort. A relative
payment scheme is also susceptible to collusion. If workers find a coordination device,
they could collectively lower their effort without changing their payment level.
We design a natural field experiment (Harrison and List, 2004) in order to find out whether
social interaction or information drove the stated results of Bandiera et al.’s (2005) study.
Our participants worked in dyads and were paid through a relative payment scheme. We
vary the possibility of social interaction and the possibility of information exchange. Our
results support the notion that social interaction reduces both output level and output
difference of the workers. Performance information exchange in a dyad does not lead to
a significant output reduction but to a reduction of the output difference. This leads to
the conclusion, that the effect in Bandiera et al. (2005) was mainly driven by the social
interaction channel.
This research adds to the literature of the effects of communication and social interaction
on employees’ output. In contrast to social interaction, which has a strong and clear
reducing effect on both output level and output difference in a relative payment scheme,
information on the coworker’s output has a weaker and ambiguous effect on the output
level and the output difference.
5
Chapter 1
How to Pay in Internet
Experiments?
Evidence from Risky Choices0
1.1 Introduction
The Internet provides a promising environment for experimental economic research. Its
subject pool has a comparatively broad demographic distribution and consists of millions
of individuals who only need to physically move towards a computer. Its lab space is never
fully booked, its session schedule exactly matches the time preferences of the participants,
and no session requires the presence of an experimenter. Nevertheless, the Internet did
not supersede the laboratory as the premier environment for experiments without subject
interaction. The most prominent concerns about Internet experiments revolve around
data structurally different to lab data, incentive incompatible payment procedures, and
more noisy data.
In this chapter, we address the question whether the Internet is a reliable experimental
environment to employ a random incentive system (RIS) (Baltussen et al., 2012) for non-
0This chapter is based on joint work with Ben Greiner and Anthony Ziegelmeyer.
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interactive, risky choices. We discuss the results from a large-scale Internet experiment
which aims to elicit risk preferences of about 3,500 participants in the same way as Holt
and Laury (2002) (HL) did in the laboratory. Only a subset of five of our participants is
paid for one out of ten choices. We compare our results to results from two complementary
laboratory treatments which implement a similar decision task but provide much higher
probabilities of being paid. Specifically, in one laboratory treatment we use the same
stakes and ten-choice list as in the Internet, but a participant selection probability of
1/15, while in another treatment we divide the stakes by 5, but pay 1/3 of participants
according to one of their ten choices.
Many experiments pay a randomly selected part of participants’ decisions, or even a
randomly selected subset of participants. Such an RIS has been a widely used method
in experimental economics since its beginnings.1 Its advantage is that more choices can
be elicited from participants. Specifically, it allows collecting decisions in different tasks
from the very same subjects without inducing the problem of reference-point or wealth
effects. These might occur if participants change their behavior in a later task due to
income earned or lost in earlier tasks. Additionally, compared to paying all decisions by
all participants, the random lottery design enables the researcher to increase the stakes in
the single decision tasks while keeping the costs of the experiment at an affordable level.2
If a researcher conducts an experiment outside of the laboratory to increase the number
of participants and without changing the payment scheme, the funds have to be increased
accordingly. But the payment of thousands of participants is beyond the budget line of
many researchers. Every such budget constrained researcher is interested in alternative
payment schemes. This is exactly our research question. We want to find out, whether an
1In the literature, this kind of payment is often given different names, e.g. random lottery incentive
system (Starmer and Sugden, 1991) or random lottery selection method (Holt, 1986). An extensive review
and names list can be found in Baltussen et al. (2012).
2A related scheme is the strategy method (Selten, 1967), in which subjects submit full strategy profiles
conditional on other players’ choices. The profiles are then played out against each other, rather than
making choices one by one during the course of play. This method allows to observe choice behavior at
nodes which are rarely reached in pure play. The strategy method might suffer from similar problems as
the lottery method: if a participant believes that a certain node will never be reached, his conditional
decision in that node is not properly incentivized.
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RIS to pay a subgroup of participants can be employed in the Internet if the goal is decision
behavior similar to the one in the laboratory. We chose the domain of individual decision
making because this domain is a natural field for Internet experiments, whose participants
can participate according to their time preferences. The chosen tasks are decisions in risky
choices because this field is well-researched and we can relate our research to it.
Internet experiments may suffer from the loss of control. Decision makers cannot be as
closely monitored as in the lab, double participation and identity fraud are harder to
tackle. Thus, we might expect that Internet experiments yield a larger amount of noise
in the data, or even systematic biases. Two main critiques have been raised regarding the
random lottery design. Holt (1986) argues that if (1) rather than isolating the different
decision tasks, participants reduce the whole experiment to a single, complex decision
problem, and (2) participants’ decisions do not follow the independence axiom of expected
utility theory (EUT), then the lottery design can generate spurious results in the sense
of cross-task contamination of decisions. Harrison (1994) points out that in a random
lottery design, the announced incentives for each task are diluted by the fact that each
task has only a small probability of being for real. Not properly incentivizing decisions
might yield more noise and biases in the collected data.
Both critiques have inspired a number of papers testing for cross-task contamination in the
random lottery method and incentive effects in experiments (see our detailed discussion in
Sections 1.2.1 and 1.2.2, respectively). The prevalent result seems to be that Holt’s (1986)
concern is unsubstantiated: while indeed many people violate the independence axiom
(see the famous Allais paradox of Allais (1953)), there is no evidence that they reduce
single tasks in the random lottery design to one complex decision problem. Increasing
stake sizes usually change the results of individual decision tasks and social interactions
quantitatively, but does not suppress the qualitative behavioral pattern.
Our main result is that our Internet setting with an RIS elicits the same risk preferences
through HL tables as a laboratory experiment with usual laboratory payment. This is
the case although we implement an ambiguous probability of being selected for payoff.
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We find no differences between the risk preferences elicited in our main laboratory treat-
ment and in the Internet treatment, which had higher stakes. However, we observe more
inconsistencies in our Internet data than in our lab data.
1.2 Related Literature
In this section we review the literature on cross-task contamination in the random incen-
tive system (1.2.1), stake size effects in experiments (1.2.2), and general effects of using
the Internet rather than the laboratory (1.2.3). For this purpose, it is helpful to follow the
terminology used in Baltussen et al. (2012) and to distinguish between within-subjects
random lottery designs (WS, only one randomly selected out of several tasks is paid),
between-subjects random lottery designs (BS, only a randomly selected subset of partic-
ipants is paid), and hybrid designs (WS & BS). Note that the cross-task contamination
critique only applies to designs with a WS dimension, while incentive dilution might be
an issue in all random lottery designs. In general, we will focus on individual decision
experiments, and will discuss interactive decision situations only marginally.
1.2.1 Isolation, Reduction and Cross-Task-Contamination in
the Random Lottery Incentive Design
In a random lottery incentive design, each experimental participant is confronted with a
number of tasks. Each task can be a choice between strategies, risky prospects, outcome
distributions, etc. Depending on choices of the participant and choices of others, each
task yields a certain monetary outcome (distribution). However, as publicly known to all
participants before the experiment, only one of the tasks will be randomly selected for
actual payment. Let us define “true” preferences with respect to a specific task as those
preferences that would be elicited if the participant would face this certain task only.
Then the question is whether a participant in a random lottery incentive design reveals
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the same ‘true’ preferences as he would in the single task.
That people violate the independence axiom in their decisions is no news for experimental
economists and psychologists. The plenty evidence for the Allais paradox is just one
example. The question remains whether participants indeed reduce the random lottery
tasks to a single choice, and this can be tested experimentally.
Within-Subjects Design (WS)
Starmer and Sugden (1991) provide experimental evidence according to which the re-
duction hypothesis in the strong form can be rejected. But they do not establish that
the random lottery design is immune to cross-task contamination.3 In order to be sure
about contamination, they propose further studies with a larger number of subjects. This
has been done by Beattie and Loomes (1997) and Cubitt et al. (1998), who do not find
contamination. The hypothesis that there is no difference between responses to random
lottery and single choice experiments seems adequate to organize the data in the case of
binary choice among simple lotteries.
Confirming these results, Laury (2005) does not find different behavior when comparing
subjects who were paid according to only one row of an HL table and subjects who were
paid according to all rows. With this finding in mind, we see our approach of paying only
one row of the HL table for a subject justified.
Hey and Lee (2005a) analyze whether subjects in an RIS context separate questions and
Hey and Lee (2005b) test whether subjects are influenced in their decisions by their past
behavior. Both results provide reassuring support for experimental economists. Subjects
seem to separate and are not influenced by past decisions.
Similarly, Camerer (1989) implements several decisions of lottery pairs for each subject.
After a lottery pair was determined for payment, he asked subjects whether they wanted
to revise their stated preference in the two lotteries. Only 2 of 80 subjects changed their
3Indeed, the reduction hypothesis represents the extreme case of such contamination, just as the
isolation hypothesis represents the opposite extreme case in which there is no contamination at all.
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preference. This is either support for the isolation effect or the independence axiom. As
his data violates the independence axiom, he concludes that these results support the
isolation effect.
In a paper that is mainly concerned with cognitive costs of decision making Wilcox (1993)
finds that the probability of task selection is not important if choices concern simple
lotteries. But still, a higher probability of task selection changed subjects’ behavior in a
complex setting. We do not see HL tables as complex (and also claim a successful job of
our instructions) and support this perspective by the very low share of inconsistencies in
our data.4
Overall, most results speak in favor of no contamination or reduction. However, Baltussen
et al. (2012) find support for contamination from one task to the following one. As the
task analyzed in this chapter is the first one in the whole experiment, we do not have to
regard such contamination.5
Between-Subjects Design (BS)
A BS design in the risk domain has been employed by Harrison et al. (2007b) and Harrison
et al. (2007a). Both studies deal with risk aversion in different field contexts. They employ
HL tables as a workhorse. The former paper estimates the risk aversion of a representative
sample of Danes, each of whom is only paid with a 10% probability. The latter paper
compares HL-elicited risk aversion to risk aversion elicited in a field context. HL tables
serve as a good proxy for risk aversion as long as the risk aversion in the field does not
have background risk.
Camerer and Ho (1994) analyze risk behavior in a laboratory setting. Their main focus is
on the betweenness axiom and nonlinear probability. In a sub-part of their experiment,
4We find inconsistencies for 5% of the lab subjects and 14.3% for the Internet subjects. Compared
to the lab studies of Holt and Laury (2002) with 19.8%, Maier and Rüger (2011) with 24%, Bruner et
al. (2008) with 30%, or Jacobson and Petrie (2009) as well as Prasad and Salmon (2010) with more than
50% of inconsistent responses, only very few of our subjects behaved inconsistently.
5This very first task consists of ten subsequent decisions. So there might be carry-over effects within
that one task. Unlike Baltussen et al. (2012) we do not provide participants with feedback in between
these ten decisions. This way, the carry-over effects are minimized. Additionally our main tool of analysis
– ordered probit regression – regards potential interdependencies of the ten decisions.
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they play out gambles for one of 36 subjects and find sound results of the elicited risk
aversion. Also in the lab, Baltussen et al. (2012) find a lower risk aversion in the BS
treatment and offer the computational ease of lottery reduction in this treatment as an
explanation.
There is general support for employing a BS design in an RIS. Although, there seem to
be some unresolved issues about the exact context in which BS yields unbiased results.
Further research should be stimulated.
Hybrid Designs (WS & BS)
In the paper mentioned in the BS paragraph, Harrison et al. (2007b) analyze risk attitudes
in Denmark. They run extra treatments in order to control for this issue and do not find
differences between a WS design and a hybrid design (footnote 16). In another large
scale experiment Harrison et al. (2002) elicit discount rates from a representative pool
of Danes and do not find differences in discount rates between the treatments with an
implementation probability of 0.25 and an implementation probability of 1.
Another study in an ultimatum bargaining context – Armantier (2006) – compares the
data of WS and BS designs and does not find differences. Stahl and Haruvy (2006) analyze
the RIS in a dictator game setting and find significant differences when it is employed.
This is achieved through path dependency, which gives potential for warm-glow effects.
Like pure WS or pure BS settings, a hybrid design does not distort the participants
decisions in risk aversion or discount rates domains. There seem to be interaction effects
in studies with a social dimension. As we can rule out direct other-regarding preferences
in our setting, we consider the latter results as negligible in our context.
1.2.2 Stake size and other incentive effects
Harrison (1994) points out that in a random lottery experiment, the apparent incentives
offered by the face values of the options are diluted by the fact that each task has only a
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small probability of being for real. Thus, the expected money payout per subject per task
is usually very small. Harrison argues that in such cases, the random lottery design is
biased towards those responses that are most likely to result through erroneous behavior:
for a given task, random lottery responses will contain more errors than single choice
responses. If we are to test this claim, we need to combine the principal hypothesis,
that the frequency of errors is negatively related to the strength of incentives, with some
auxiliary hypothesis about the properties of true preferences and/or the nature of errors.
One such auxiliary hypothesis is that true preferences satisfy the axioms of EUT, and
that the violations of EUT found in experiments are a product of the weak incentives
for correct reasoning, offered by those experiments. On this view, systematic deviations
from EUT result from subjects’ using simplifying heuristics to economize on mental effort.
The stronger the incentives associated with a decision task, the less such heuristics will
be used. One implication of this hypothesis is that violations of EUT should be more
pronounced in random lottery experiments than in single choice experiments. Wilcox
(1993) presents a version of this argument. He hypothesizes that the greater the dilution
of incentives in a random lottery design, the less “accurate” will be the heuristics used
by subjects. He reports an experiment whose results provide support for his hypothesis
when decision tasks require choices over compound lotteries, but no support in the case of
choices over simple lotteries. In other words, task complexity and strength of incentives
interact.
Another auxiliary hypothesis is that subjects’ risk aversion is positively related to the
strength of incentives. In a lottery choice experiment, Holt and Laury (2002) report
that scaling up payoffs (by factors of 20, 50, and 90) causes a significant increase in risk
aversion (see also Harrison et al., 2005 and Holt and Laury, 2005).6 Therefore, if paying
all choices (instead of one chosen at random) is interpreted by subjects as an increase in
6Note, however, that while Holt and Laury (2002) find a stake effect between 1× and higher stakes,
there are no significant differences in risk preferences among the three high stake conditions in their data.
Potential reasons include missing statistical power or some kind of adjustment to the “real” level of risk
aversion which cannot be increased by higher stakes any more.
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the expected payoff for each decision, one would expect to see more risk aversion among
subjects who are paid for all choices instead of one choice selected at random.
Laury (2005) reports a lottery choice experiment, where subjects are presented the same
choice tasks as in Holt and Laury (2002). She tests whether subjects behave as if each
of these choices involves the stated payoffs, or if subjects scale-down payoffs to account
for the random selection that is made. Three treatments are conducted: pay for 1 of 10
choices under low payoffs, pay for 10 of 10 choices under low payoffs, and pay for 1 of
10 choices under 10x the low payoff level. Increasing payoff scale has a significant effect
on choices compared with the low payoff treatments where all 10 decisions are paid, or
where one decision is paid. However, there is no significant difference in choices between
paying for 1 or all 10 decisions at the low payoff level. This again supports the validity
of the random lottery incentive system in the case of choice among simple lotteries.
Summarizing the results from the given studies high payoffs “sharpen” the results of ex-
perimental research compared to the usual lab payoffs. They at least reduce variance
around an (expected) theoretical outcome and often enough shift the results to this out-
come. In the context of risk aversion, they make this aversion more pronounced. High
stakes do not rule out irrational behavior.
1.2.3 Internet experiments vs. lab experiments
When leaving the lab as an environment for the experiment, the experimenter loses some
control, as she cannot control the participants’ behavior as well as in the lab any more.
For example multiple participation in the laboratory can be prevented to a much higher
extent than in the Internet, where individuals have a positive chance to pass various
checks and register more than once in the internet section of our experiment. On the
positive side are the increased number of participants and the broader variety of their
characteristics.
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Anderhub et al. (2001) provide – to the best of our knowledge – the first comparison
between internet and laboratory experiments in economic decision making. They run
an experiment concerned with individual decision making in the field of inter-temporal
choices. Internet and lab environments generated similar data with Internet data showing
the usually higher variance.
The Internet compared to the laboratory as an experimental environment seems to have
an effect similar to low stakes compared to high stakes. It increases variance of the data,
moves it (further) away from theoretical predictions, and reduces risk aversion. However,
it is important to note that in general terms the data is still fine. Internet participants
submit similar decisions as lab participants.
To fully exploit the possibilities of Internet experiments the researcher has to implement
an RIS. Only this provides her with the possibility of recruiting more participants than
in the lab without paying for each and every single one of them. Potential obstacles are
interaction effects between the RIS and the Internet environment. So before an experi-
mental setting with an RIS in the Internet is declared as a sound method, it has to be
tested. Does this setting provide the researcher with the same results a regular lab setting
would? To the best of our knowledge there is no research on decision making in such a
setting. We provide results from the domain of risky choices. Our results support the
notion that the Internet and RIS are on good terms with each other. At least for the
domain of risk aversion, RIS and the Internet can be used together.
1.3 Research Design
1.3.1 General Setup
The risk preferences elicitation experiment we describe in this chapter was embedded in
a larger research project on the processing of information in parimutuel and double auc-
tion prediction markets. As the underlying event for the experiment we chose the FIFA
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Soccer World Cup 2006. Our Internet session with 3,582 participants is an “artefactual
field experiment” in the terminology of Harrison and List (2004): it has a nonstandard
subject pool but still employs an abstract framing and an imposed set of rules.7 In order
to compare this dataset to lab data, we ran additional laboratory sessions. 120 individ-
uals in 8 sessions took part in the Cologne Laboratory for Economic Research (CLER).
Participants were recruited from those in the CLER subject pool who did not participate
in the Internet experiment. Sessions lasted approximately one hour. Additional to their
earnings from the experiment, laboratory participants received a showup fee of 2.50e.
All participants selected for payment were informed by e-mail and paid by wire transfer
after the World Cup final took place.
Participants of the Internet experiments were recruited by inviting individuals from several
subject pools of experimental laboratories in Germany.8 This way we did not fully exploit
one of the advantages of Internet experiments - diversity in subject characteristics. But
this gave us similar subject pools across our Internet and lab experiments, which will later
on help in our analysis.9 In order to demonstrate the serious scientific background as
well as the financial capacity to pay the participants’ winnings, the experiment homepage
prominently informed that the experiment was conducted by researchers of the University
of Cologne and the Max Planck Institute of Economics in Jena.
The entire webpage was presented in German and in English. In a first step of the
registration process, participants filled in a form which asked for name, e-mail address,
a chosen username and password, and then received an e-mail with a link to verify and
7For the extent of “artefactuality” of the online session see the next paragraph and the descriptives
in Section 2.4.1.
8We gratefully acknowledge the support of the experimental laboratories at the University of Bonn,
the University of Cologne, the University of Erfurt, Humboldt-University of Berlin, the Technical Uni-
versity of Berlin, the Max-Planck-Institute of Economics in Jena, the University of Magdeburg, and the
University of Mannheim. All laboratories used the recruitment system ORSEE (Greiner, 2004) for ap-
proaching participants by e-mail. Additionally we sent e-mails to mailing lists at the University of Cologne
and posted links at the university’s web pages. E-mail recipients could forward the invitation without
invalidating the registration link. Participants could also register by directly accessing the experiment
homepage www.torlabor.de.
982% of our participants stated that they reacted to an invitation e-mail, while 16% registered due
to the recommendation of a friend, and the remaining 2% came through other channels.
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complete their registration.10 The next step was to make choices in the HL table described
below. This was followed by a questionnaire for demographical data like year of birth, job,
student and employment status, field of studies, etc.11 Screenshots of the registration page
and the demographic questionnaire can be found in the appendix. After this registration
procedure, participants could enter the belief elicitation tasks and the markets for the 64
world cup games.
In both the Internet experiment and the corresponding laboratory sessions, taking part
in this risk preferences elicitation procedure was the first of three tasks participants had
to complete. In all conditions, the second task was to state probabilistic beliefs about
possible outcomes of the soccer matches in the FIFA World Cup 2006, and the third task
consisted of trading contracts that yield payments based on the outcomes of these soccer
matches. In the Internet treatment, the second and third task were completed over the
course of the World Cup, for 64 matches played in four weeks. The lab sessions lasted for
approximately one hour and the subject for the second and the third task was the final
between Italy and France. In this chapter, we focus on the first task, which is the risk
preferences elicitation described below. To keep the experiment environment as similar as
possible, all experimental instructions were identical in the Internet and in the laboratory.
In the Internet, risk choices were made in a web form, while they were collected by pen
and paper in the lab.
As already described, we set up two main treatments - Internet and laboratory. The
Internet treatment deals with relatively high stakes and a low probability of being picked
for payment. The laboratory treatment has usual lab stakes and a much higher probability
10The primary key to differentiate participants was their e-mail address. It was impossible to register
multiple times with the same e-mail address. Still participants could circumvent this check by using
different e-mail addresses. To minimize multiple registrations, it was explicitly noted that this would
lead to immediate exclusion from the experiment and all payments. Regularly we conducted spot tests.
As none of our checks yielded a cheating participant we never had to exclude a participant because of
multiple registrations.
11Most answers were voluntary. We emphasized that answering the voluntary questions and answering
truthfully would strongly support our work as researchers. But we also encouraged participants to
skip questions they were uncomfortable with, so they would not quit their registration out of privacy
reasons. We did not elicit the full set of demographics from all participants, as maximizing the number
of participants was our main goal.
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of being chosen for payment.12 These two treatments resemble the usual characteristics of
laboratory and Internet experiments. As the Internet session was part of a larger project,
we could not vary its dimensions of payment probability or stake size. And introducing
a laboratory treatment which mimics the payment probability of the Internet treatment
(0.14%) would have been infeasible. Therefore, as an auxiliary treatment we introduce a
laboratory treatment in which we reduce the payment probability but increase the stake
size to the Internet stake size. This leaves us with three different treatments overall: lab
regular stakes (60 participants), Internet (3,582 participants), and lab high stakes (60
participants).
To motivate participants we used an RIS. In the Internet, five of all participants were
paid according to one of their choices in the risk preference elicitation task.13 However,
there was no hint at all on the web pages about the total number of participants. As
a downside, we generate ambiguity about the payment probability. This adds a new
dimension to the analysis. But as an upside, our expected payment was orthogonal to
the number of participants as we only paid a certain number of them regardless of the
overall participant number. The ex post probability to be selected for payment in the
risk preference elicitation task was 5/3582=0.14%. As only one of ten choices of the MPL
was paid, the probability that an individual choice mattered was 0.014%. Due to the
nondisclosure of the participant number, no subject knew about this figure.
An alternative to this approach would have been to pay a fixed number per 100 par-
ticipants. This procedure would not have let ambiguity influence our results. But this
way, the expected payoffs would have been related to the number of participants. As this
Internet experiment was the first one using this recruiting procedure we had no sound
estimate of the potential participant number.
In the lab high stakes payoff scheme, the associated payoffs of lottery choices were the
12Actually, the probability is 1 as everybody in this treatment was payed. Not all participants were
payed for the same task, though.
13Another 5 were paid according to their belief statements, and another 20 according to their market
performance. It was emphasized in the instructions of each task that participants who were paid according
to one task would not be paid according to another one.
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same as used in the Internet and shown in Table 1.1. A screenshot of the table displayed
to the participants can be found in the appendix. Only one of the 15 participants in each
session was paid according to one of her HL table choices. Thus, moving the experiment
from the Internet into the lab increased the objective probability that an individual HL
table choice mattered to 1/15 * 1/10 = 0.667%, which is almost 50 times higher than
in the Internet. More important than that, the participants in both lab payoff schemes
had no ambiguity about the payment probability. Under the lab regular stakes payoff
scheme, we changed the monetary lottery payoffs and the selection probability, but kept
the expected money payout per decision constant.14 Specifically, 5 randomly selected
out of the 15 participants were paid according to one of their HL table choices, but all
monetary lottery payoffs in Table 1.1 were divided by 5. Thus, the probability that one
of the lab regular stakes HL decisions mattered was now 1/3 * 1/10 = 3.333%.15
1.3.2 Risk Elicitation
Our workhorse in this chapter is a simple experimental measure for risk aversion called
multiple price list (MPL), introduced by Holt and Laury (2002). This approach goes back
to a method originally presented in section 6.2(a) of Farquhar (1984). The HL table has
been heavily used in laboratory experiments. The method involves a relatively transparent
task: Each subject is presented with a choice between two lotteries which we call A and
B.16 Table 1.1 illustrates the basic payoff matrix presented to subjects in our Internet
experiment.17 The first row shows that lottery A offers a 10% chance of receiving 100e
and a 90% chance of receiving 80e. Similarly, lottery B in the first row has the same
probabilities, but for payoffs of 192.50e and 5e, respectively. Thus the two lotteries
14In the HL tables we kept the numerical amounts associated with the lotteries identical. Instead of
Euro we used ECU (Experimental Currency Units) in the lab, with publicly known conversion rates of
1e (0.2e) for 1 ECU, respectively, in the high (regular) stakes condition.
15In the lab high stakes payment scheme, two further participants in each session were selected for
payment of the second and third task, respectively. Under the lab regular stakes scheme, 5 of the 10
remaining participants were paid for the second task, and the last five for the third task. The lab regular
payoff scheme represents the usual application of a within-subjects RIS.
16In their analysis, HL coined the descriptions “safe” and “risky” for lotteries A and B, respectively.
17At the time of the experiment, the exchange rate of 1e was about US$1.25.
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Table 1.1: The ten paired lottery-choice decisions
CRRA coefficient if
row was last A choice,
Row Lottery A Lottery B EA − EB below all B choices
1 { 100e, 0.1 ; 80e, 0.9 } { 192.50e, 0.1 ; 5e, 0.9 } 58.25e [-1.71; -0.95]
2 { 100e, 0.2 ; 80e, 0.8 } { 192.50e, 0.2 ; 5e, 0.8 } 41.50e [-0.95; -0.49]
3 { 100e, 0.3 ; 80e, 0.7 } { 192.50e, 0.3 ; 5e, 0.7 } 24.75e [-0.49; -0.14]
4 { 100e, 0.4 ; 80e, 0.6 } { 192.50e, 0.4 ; 5e, 0.6 } 8.00e [-0.14; 0.15]
5 { 100e, 0.5 ; 80e, 0.5 } { 192.50e, 0.5 ; 5e, 0.5 } -8.75e [0.15; 0.41]
6 { 100e, 0.6 ; 80e, 0.4 } { 192.50e, 0.6 ; 5e, 0.4 } -25.50e [0.41; 0.68]
7 { 100e, 0.7 ; 80e, 0.3 } { 192.50e, 0.7 ; 5e, 0.3 } -42.25e [0.68; 0.97]
8 { 100e, 0.8 ; 80e, 0.2 } { 192.50e, 0.8 ; 5e, 0.2 } -59.00e [0.97; 1.37]
9 { 100e, 0.9 ; 80e, 0.1 } { 192.50e, 0.9 ; 5e, 0.1 } -75.75e [1.37; ∞)
10 { 100e, 1.0 ; 80e, 0.0 } { 192.50e, 1.0 ; 5e, 0.0 } -92.50e non-monotone
Notes: EA−EB denotes the expected payoff difference between lottery A and lottery B. The payoffs
above were used in the Internet experiment and the high stakes lab sessions. For the regular stakes
lab sessions, the exchange rate into real money was 0.2. Participants were only shown the information
of the first three columns. They had no explicit information on E or the CRRA coefficient.
have a relatively large difference in expected values, in this case 58.25e. As one proceeds
down the list, the expected values of both lotteries increase, but eventually the expected
value of lottery B exceeds the expected value of lottery A. Understanding HL tables is
straightforward and explains their vast dispersion in experimental economics. The subject
simply chooses lottery A or lottery B in each of the ten rows. After completion, one row
is selected at random for payout of a certain subject. The chosen lottery is played out.
In terms of expected value, lottery B grows more attractive relative to lottery A with
each step down the list. On the contrary, in each single row apart from row 10 lottery
B bears the higher variance. The underlying logic of an HL table is that subjects face a
tradeoff between expected value difference and variance. The last row is essentially a test
whether the subject understood the instructions and has no relevance for risk aversion. It
basically is the choice between 100e and 192.50e so every subject should choose Lottery
B in row 10.18 A risk neutral subject should choose the lottery with the higher expected
value in each row. Hence a risk-neutral subject would choose A for the first four rows and
B thereafter. We define the “switching point” as the first decision in which lottery B is
chosen. A subject with an earlier switching point is classified as “risk loving” whereas a
18Monotonicity assumed.
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subject with a later switching point is classified as “risk averse”.
To a rational agent, in row i, lottery Bi relative to lottery Ai should be at least as
attractive as lottery Bi−1 relative to lottery Ai−1. We should rarely see an agent choose
B in one row and choose A in the next row. Andersen et al. (2006) and Harrison et al.
(2007a) discuss conditions in which switching from B to A can occur without violating
rationality. For example, simply a “fatter” indifference curve of a participant. We refrain
from these rather special cases and label participants, who switch from B to A at any
two consecutive rows or choose A in the ultimate row as “inconsistent”.19
Holt and Laury (2002) focus on their whole dataset including inconsistent participants.
When building the graphs, they sort the participants’ choices. Meaning, all A choices are
sorted to be before all B choices. This way, possible inconsistencies are assumed away.20
This approach is debatable as it includes subjects who are potentially irrational or did
not understand the experimental rules. In the best case this merely brings noise to the
data, in the worst case, there are systematic biases. However, this approach entails the
advantage of never having to worry about selection effects as the researcher is never forced
to exclude subjects as “inconsistent”. One way to circumvent this calamity is to simply
ask participants for their switching point instead of asking for their decision in each row.
But this procedure imposes the single switching point on the participants. So the data
will seem to be fine but are not generated in a way that fully reflects the participants
desired choices. Our approach lets subjects choose the lottery for each row individually.
In order to catch all effects, our analysis will regard the entire dataset as well as the
dataset without inconsistent participants.
HL tables have the major drawback that their classification of “risk aversion” is not based
on a general concept of risk. They require one certain utility framework (e.g. EUT)
for all agents to classify their risk aversion relative to each other. There is increasing
19One could go further and distinguish between “inconsistency of type 1” for switchers from B to A
and “inconsistency of type 2” for participants that chose the first-order stochastically dominated lottery A
in the ultimate row. Arguably, the potentially underlying misconceptions of these two types are different.
We do not think that this approach would add to our analysis and therefore refrain from it.
20It still may be the case that a subject chose A throughout the list.
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literature on agents without an EUT compatible utility function, e.g. Harrison et al.
(2010) and Harrison and Rutström (2009) find that agents seem to be split into groups
using Prospect Theory or EUT or even a single person’s choices are properly described
by using both models in decision making. Maier and Rüger (2011) discuss this issue
and propose a method to measure risk aversion model-independently via an MPL. Also,
HL tables with their changing probabilities are sensitive to probability weighting of the
participants. Another way to elicit risk aversion was proposed by Hey and Orme (1994)
and is becoming increasingly popular. With the help of this approach, the researcher
is able to get better estimates of the participants’ risk aversion. This is mainly due to
the fact that many observations (instead of just one from an MPL) are collected. In our
design we needed an easy to implement task which would give us a fair estimate of a
participant’s risk aversion. In this regard, HL tables were best suited.
1.3.3 Inconsistency
The researcher has to regard inconsistent HL table choices in the analysis of risk aversion.
This can help to distinguish decisions based on actual risk attitudes from mistakes.21 This
section deals with the influence of mistakes on measured risk aversion. In order to make
a clear point, we treat the data like Holt and Laury (2002) in this example – we sort A
and B choices and assume A choices to be in lower number rows than B choices.22 Our
main analysis later on does not sort the data in any way. For simplicity, we focus on a
classical HL table with two lottery choices per row, ten decision rows, and a risk-neutral
switching point from A to B (i.e. the first choice of B) at row 5 just as in Table 1.1.23 The
argument can be generalized to MPLs with more than two lotteries per row, a different
risk-neutral switching point, and a row number different from ten.
21Jacobson and Petrie (2009) discuss the added value of analyzing mistakes interacted with risk aver-
sion data in a field experiment.
22The argument in this example is valid for all completed tables with a general tendency to choose A
in lower number rows and B in higher number rows. This is the greatly predominant pattern found in
completed HL tables of the usual design.
23A later switching point means risk aversion, an earlier one means risk love.
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Suppose we have unbiased mistakes - choosing B instead of the true preference A or
vice versa with equal probabilities and independent of the lottery probabilities/stakes.
The more mistakes the MPL of an individual has, the stronger are our expectations of
the answer distribution being shifted to an equal distribution of A and B choices. In the
extreme case, an individual answers all rows randomly with an expected equal distribution
of five A and five B choices – a switching point at row 6. In a regular HL table like ours,
this implied a slightly risk averse individual. Would an HL table be designed with a
switching point for a risk-neutral individual at a row number greater than 6 (at row
6), an MPL with only mistake choices would let us expectedly classify the individual as
risk-loving (risk-neutral).
Generally said, mistakes gravitate the choice distribution towards equality. This argument
is akin to the one in Harrison (1994). In HL graphs like in Figure 1.1, this means a line
similar to the one of a risk neutral subject but with a switching point at decision 6, not at
decision 5. Were the line of the true preferences to the southwest (northeast) of that line,
we would get more (less) risk aversion or less (more) risk love via the mistakes. Whether it
were more/less risk aversion/love depended on the risk-neutral switching point. Given the
usual risk-neutral switching point at row 5 and the average pattern to choose A in more
than five rows (risk averse behavior), inconsistency expectedly decreases risk aversion as
a statistical artefact. As our data shows all usual patterns expected from HL data we
anticipate such a result in our data as well.24
This effect has to be taken into account as it may bias the results of HL tables. Mistakes
orthogonal to stake size and probabilities can result in biased data simply by the design
of the table. Say we would find the usual pattern of higher risk aversion of women in our
entire dataset. If the “female” dummy did not show a higher risk aversion coefficient in
24The whole argument is put forward without regarding probability weighting. Probability weighting
participants would entail an increased frequency of inconsistent switching points closer to the inflection
point of the probability weighting function. Depending on which weighting function was the more accurate
one, the participants are more likely to be inconsistent around p = 0.5 like in Quiggin’s (1982) function or
around p = 1/e like in Prelec’s (1998) function. Regarding probability weighting correctly in our analysis
would greatly increase the complexity and extent of our analysis – especially with our given dataset –
without adding much quality to our results. We therefore do not go deeper into this subtopic.
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the consistent dataset and women submitted less inconsistent HL tables than men, the
risk aversion result would most probably be due to the inconsistencies but not to actual
preferences. It is therefore essential to take a look at the whole dataset as well as at the
consistent subset. The whole dataset will provide the researcher with maximum statistical
power, while the consistent subset will help to pinpoint the results, especially concerning
the demographic analysis. This is particularly useful for the comparison of Internet data
(in which we expect more inconsistencies) to laboratory data. Results of the comparison
from the entire dataset might vanish or even reverse if we analyze the consistent data
only.
1.3.4 Random Incentive Schemes & Ambiguity Aversion
Ambiguity aversion could have influenced the risk aversion results of our online experi-
ment. The literature on the relation between risk and ambiguity aversion shows mixed
results. Cohen et al. (1987) as well as Curley et al. (1986) find ambiguity aversion to be
uncorrelated to risk aversion. Potamites and Zhang (2007) find a slight positive correla-
tion. Lauriola and Levin (2001) as well as Lauriola et al. (2007) find a positive correlation,
just like Kocher and Trautmann (2013). Bossaerts et al. (2007) and Charness and Gneezy
(2010) support this finding. While newer literature seems to endorse a positive correlation,
overall there does not seem to be a clear consensus about this relationship. We cannot
rule out that ambiguity aversion influenced the risk preferences of the online participants.
However, the recruiting process of usual laboratory experiments brings along ambiguity
as well. Participants are never told, how much money they can make and only frequent
visitors can estimate a fair earnings interval. So we do not think that ambiguity massively
influenced our results.
With our given Internet dataset, we cannot properly analyze ambiguity aversion of the
participants let alone the correlation to risk aversion. However, we can get some sugges-
tive results from our data. By definition, ambiguity aversion is negatively correlated with
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participation in an experiment with an ambiguous payment scheme like in our Internet
experiment. In case of a positive correlation of ambiguity aversion to risk aversion, par-
ticipation should also be negatively correlated to risk aversion. This in turn would lead
to a population of lower risk aversion than we would have gotten had we not introduced
ambiguity in the payment procedure. In a classical HL graph, the curve would be shifted
to the southwest. We briefly analyze this explanation in the concluding section.
1.4 Hypotheses
As a first hypotheses we think about control in two directions. As already stated, the
experimenter has less control over the participant. She has less control over his under-
standing of the rules, his attention to and concentration on the task, and his attempts to
game the experimental rules. Additionally, the participant himself also has less control
over the experimenter. He cannot ensure his payment the way he can in a lab experiment
or get questions answered in an extensive and personal way. Therefore, choices might get
a hypothetical touch and/or choices might not be based on an actual understanding of
the game. The former can make choices arbitrary, the latter can lead to noisy or even
biased data. This hypothesis is analyzed by comparing the inconsistent behavior in the
Internet and in the laboratory.
Our second and main hypothesis is that Internet experiments lead to data different from
lab data. If true, this would entail different experimental conclusions than from laboratory
experiments. This invalidated Internet experiments as a substitute for lab experiments.
It is important to stress that we exclusively focus on the step of conducting a laboratory
experiment with an RIS online. We do not analyze the step from the laboratory into the
Internet as a technique to add field context. We analyze this hypothesis by comparing
risk aversion between the Internet and the laboratory.
With the help of our first hypothesis we can split our main hypothesis into two more
concrete hypotheses: (A) Data from the Internet is structurally different from lab data.
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In our context this would mean a different appeal of a HL risk aversion graph. It may
lead to flat line at a certain y-level, an ascending curve, or even a curve with descending
as well as ascending sections. (B) Through more inconsistencies, the internet data shows
less risk aversion than lab data with identical stakes.
1.5 Results
The descriptives and the nonparametric tests use the entire dataset. The analyses which
include demographic data were conducted with the subgroup of participants which sub-
mitted the respective demographic information. This reduces the observation number
of the respective analysis, but the remaining number of participants is still 2,400 and
2,700 for consistent and inconsistent participants, respectively. Statistical tests with the
treatment levels only support our findings – although the results get sharpened by the
demographics. We assume that submitting demographic data is orthogonal to risk and
ambiguity aversion so that we do not regard selection as a reason for data confound. In
this section of the analysis we do not sort the participants’ decisions in any way.
1.5.1 Descriptives
We collected MPL risk preference data from three different experimental treatments:
the Internet treatment with an ambiguous selection probability and high stakes (see Ta-
ble 1.1), one laboratory treatment with the same stakes and a choice selection probability
of 0.667%, and another laboratory treatment with stake sizes divided by 5, but a 5 times
higher choice selection probability of 3.333%.
Table 1.2 displays a summary of demographic characteristics of the participants. Our
subject populations appear to be very similar across conditions for most demographic
factors – a result of our efforts to mostly recruit for the Internet experiment from standard
laboratory subject pools. This way we gave up an advantage of an internet experiment –
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Table 1.2: Demographic Characteristics of participants in the three
experimental conditions
Internet Lab High Stakes Lab Low Stakes
Number of participants 3,582 60 60
Avg. response rate 96.8% 100.0% 100.0%
Age Avg. (StdDev) 25.6 (5.8) 24.5 (4.2) 24.4 (3.9)
Sex male 62.5% 36.7% 36.7%
Marital Status
Single 90.1% 94.9% 98.3%
Married 6.1% 5.1% 1.7%
Other 3.8% 0.0% 0.0%
Charge of expenses
Self 81.9% 81.7% 76.7%
Parents 11.3% 16.7% 20.0%
Spouse 1.1% 1.7% 1.7%
Other 5.6% 0.0% 1.7%
Most frequent countries of origin
Germany 89.9% 85.0% 73.3%
China 1.0%
Turkey 0.8%
Russia 0.8% 3.3%
Poland 0.6%
Bulgaria 3.3% 5.0%
Ukraine 3.3%
Kazakhstan 3.3%
Other 7.1% 5.1% 18.4%
Share of students 79.8% 93.3% 96.7%
For students:
Semester Avg. (StdDev) 6.00 (3.75) 4.55 (3.41) 5.11 (4.02)
Field of Studies
Bus. Adm. 24.5% 43.9% 35.7%
Economics 18.8% 15.8% 16.1%
Engineering 8.0% 1.8% 1.8%
Natural Science 6.9% 3.5% 8.9%
Law 6.4% 5.3% 8.9%
Other 35.4% 29.8% 28.6%
the higher diversity of demographics.
An obvious difference is the higher share of male participants in the Internet treatment.
Internet participants were recruited with explicit information of the underlying soccer
markets. In contrast to that, laboratory participants were invited in the usual way with-
out any announcement about the experimental topic and with exclusion of the online
participants. Therefore, a lower share of women in the Internet treatment is expected.25
We control for this by demographics coefficients in the econometric analysis. The gen-
eral similarities in our subject pools and the demographic controls and our demographic
25In Europe, association football is a sport chiefly played and watched by men.
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controls let us be confident that any differences we might observe between our laboratory
sessions and the Internet experiment are mainly due to the different environments and/or
payment probabilities.
Figure 1.1: Proportion of safe choices in each decision
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Figure 1.1 shows the share of A choices for each of the ten decisions in each of our three
treatments, separately for the entire dataset (upper panel) and the subset of consistent
participants (lower panel). As a first observation, the population as a whole of each
treatment is risk-averse: compared to a risk-neutral population, there is a considerable
28
Internet Payment
shift of the curve to the northeast in all treatments.26 Comparing the treatments to each
other, the Internet data crosses the lines of the other treatments and somewhat falls in
between the curves of the regular and the high stake lab treatments. If anything, it is
slightly closer to the lab regular stakes treatment. Narrowing our focus to consistent
choices reveals a clearer picture: Internet participants behave very much like low stake
lab participants, while high stake lab participants show a slightly stronger risk-aversion.
1.5.2 Inconsistency
We now turn to the number of consistent choices within each of our treatments. While in
each of our laboratory conditions merely 5% of participants (3 out of 60 in both conditions,
so 6 out of 120 overall) submit inconsistent choice profiles, the share of inconsistent
participants in the Internet data is 14.3% (513 out of 3,582). We therefore expect a
significant influence of the Internet environment on an inconsistent completion of our HL
table.
We run a probit analysis on the whole dataset in order to find out, whether an Internet
environment actually leads to inconsistency and what demographical factors have an
influence on completing an MPL inconsistently. Table 1.3 summarizes the results. We
can see that the probability to be inconsistent strongly increases if the experiment is
conducted online instead of in a laboratory.
Result 1 [Inconsistency, Treatment Comparison]
Internet participants show a strongly increased probability of inconsistent behavior com-
pared to lab participants.
There is no significant influence of the coefficient for the lab high stakes treatment. This
leads to the conclusion that there is no effect of the stake size on filling out the question-
26Like in all HL graphs, a curve northeast to the risk neutral curve means risk aversion and a curve
southwest to the risk neutral curve means risk love.
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Table 1.3: Probit Estimates of Inconsistent Choice
Model 1 Model 2
Coefficient Std. Err. Coefficient Std. Err.
Constant -2.0807*** (0.3008) -2.5919*** (0.4417)
Internet 0.6542** (0.2791) 0.8514*** (0.3284)
Lab High Stakes 0.0169 (0.3896) 0.2540 (0.4346)
Female 0.2448*** (0.0532) 0.2592*** (0.0638)
Age 0.0103** (0.0042)
Age (at begin of studies) 0.0202* (0.0123)
Semester -0.0244*** (0.0089)
Field of studies
Economics -0.0682 (0.1033)
Engineering 0.1867 (0.1293)
Natural Science 0.1635 (0.1376)
Law 0.4277*** (0.1280)
Other 0.308*** (0.0817)
Home country
China 0.1406 (0.3064)
Turkey 0.5486* (0.2900)
Russia 0.2658 (0.2928)
Poland -0.1099 (0.3964)
Bulgaria 0.1693 (0.5686)
Ukraine 0.3658 (0.3941)
Kazakhstan (omitted)
Other 0.6442*** (0.1144)
Charge of expenses
Parents 0.0897 (0.0912)
Spouse 0.3771 (0.2662)
Other -0.0761 (0.1536)
Marital status
Married 0.2127 (0.2032)
Other 0.2565 (0.1624)
Number of obs 3,594 2,832
Log likelihood -1,446 -1,059
LR χ2(4) resp. χ2(22) 36.11 122.35
Prob > χ2 0.0000 0.0000
Pseudo R2 0.0123 0.0546
Notes: *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respec-
tively. The baseline category is “Lab Low Stakes”. In Model 2, omitted variables
are the ones with the highest frequency in their respective class: Business Admin-
istration (field of studies), Germany (home country), Self (charge of expenses),
Single (marital status). Additionally, Home country Kazakhstan is omitted be-
cause of perfect prediction (missing variance).
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naire inconsistently. So it does not seem that participants of our experiment had to be
financially motivated to take the experiment seriously. The regular lab stakes sufficed.27
Female subjects show a significantly increased probability of inconsistency. The par-
ticipants’ age at the beginning of studies as well as semester also have a (marginally)
significant influence on the probability of inconsistence. The influence goes in opposite -
albeit expectable - directions. Subjects, who were older at the beginning of their studies
have an increased probability of inconsistency. We expect them to have repeated at least
one year in school (which in the German school system is implemented if the pupil per-
formed insufficiently that very year) or qualified for university studies after having already
worked in a job which required a lesser degree28. So we expected a higher probability of
inconsistency for these participants. A higher semester is associated with a higher edu-
cation. This made us expect a lower probability for inconsistency. However, the actual
impact of the semester and age at beginning of studies coefficients is economically negli-
gible. We do not find any influences of marital status or who is in charge of the expenses
of the household.
Students of law and “other” majors are much more likely to be inconsistent than students
of the other categories. An anticipated result, as both categories of studies are the ones
with the least math classes. (“Other” contained the humanities.) Country dummies,
which have a significant effect are Turkey and “Other”. The latter includes countries
like Colombia, France, Hungary, Italy, the Netherlands, the USA, and Vietnam. We
cannot find any clear cultural pattern in “Other” countries. So overall the tendency to
inconsistency seems to rather spring from language problems than from one clear cultural
difference to German participants. It is fair to assume this as the reason for the increased
inconsistency probability of Turkish participants as well.
Result 2 [Inconsistency, Demographic Analysis]
27Alternatively, the participants computed the task like one big compound lottery, including the
exchange rates of the stakes. In this case, there was no expected stake size difference in the two lab
treatments. Participants do not seem to have done this, see Section 1.2 and Section 1.5.3.
28This is called “zweiter Bildungsweg” – “second way of education” – in Germany. This includes all
ways to earn a qualification to enter university apart from the regular school path.
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(a) The stake size and the lottery procedure do not influence the probability of inconsistent
behavior in the laboratory.
(b) Female subjects as well as subjects which were older at the beginning of their studies
have an increased probability of inconsistent behavior. Subjects in later semesters show a
decreased probability.
(c) Untrained math skills as well as language problems increase the probability of incon-
sistent behavior.
1.5.3 Risk Aversion
From here on we focus on the risk aversion analysis. We choose three methods in order to
analyze the data. The first part relies on nonparametric tests. This is followed by ordered
probit analysis, our main tool. Both approaches have the advantage that they are agnostic
about functional forms of the utility function. The ordered probit analysis additionally
offers to employ control variables. The final part employs an interval regression. A CRRA
utility function is assumed and we run regressions with intervals for the risk aversion
parameter.
Nonparametric Tests
To nonparametrically test for differences in risk attitudes, we conduct Kolmogorov-
Smirnov (KS) tests comparing the distribution of safe choice frequencies between treat-
ments. Table 1.4 lists the results. The differences we observe between our treatments are
not significant, neither for comparing our lab treatments to each other nor for comparing
Internet data with each of our lab treatments. We obtain this result for the entire dataset
as well as for the consistent data only. So as our first tentative result we have three
payment schemes which lead to similar risk aversion measures in HL tables. A closer look
at the data might reveal slight differences or differences based on variables we did not
control for in the nonparametric approach.
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Table 1.4: Results of Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests on
differences in distribution of safe choices
All choices Consistent choices
p-value p-value
Lab (low stakes) vs.
Internet 0.732 0.947
Lab (high stakes) 0.432 0.398
Internet vs.
Lab (high stakes) 0.240 0.262
Note: All tests are two-sided.
The nonparametric tests and also Figure 1.1 show that our Internet data is not structurally
different from our lab data.
Result 3 [Risk Aversion, Structural Data Differences]
The Internet as an experimental environment does not lead to structurally different data
compared to laboratory data.
Ordered Probit Regressions
As the main method we employ ordered probit regressions. For analyzing HL tables they
were introduced by Harrison et al. (2005) and we essentially use their publicly available
Stata code.29 They put forward the argument that ordered probit regressions do not rely
on any functional form of the utility function and take care of the order as well as the
interdependencies of the ten decisions in an HL table. Therefore it is an appropriate
method to analyze this kind of data.
The given Stata code does not count the safe choices like Holt and Laury (2002) do in
their analysis. It instead uses the minimum switching point (MSP) as the dependent
variable. The MSP is the first decision in which a subject chooses Lottery B. This way,
the first choice of the “risky” lottery is marked as the pivotal decision in this context.
Switching back and forth after this decision is not included in the analysis.30 In the case
29We kindly thank Harrison, Johnson, McInnes, and Rutström for making the code accessible on the
ExLab website.
30Which is the difference of the “minimum switching point” to the “switching point”. The latter can
only be used for consistent data.
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of such a “fatter” indifference curve, only the most risk loving border of the indifference
curve is regarded through the MSP.31 We run the whole analysis with the MSP as the
dependent variable (like Harrison et al. (2005)) as well as with the number of A choices
(in the spirit of Holt and Laury (2002)) as the dependent variable in order to check for
the results’ robustness. Note, that this code cannot deal with participants, who chose
Option A throughout the whole list. Therefore, these 176 participants (1 of them being
a lab participant) are excluded from the ordered probit analysis.32
Figure 1.2 (upper panel) is obtained by running an ordered probit regression model with
an extensive set of control variables33 on the whole dataset. The first observation of the
graph is that the curve of the Internet data is virtually identical to the graph of the
regular lab stakes data.34 The second observation is the line of the lab high stakes data
being stronger curved to the northeast than the other lines and all its datapoints apart
from the one at decision 10 are lying above the datapoints of the other lines. Despite this
substantial graphic difference the effect is not significant in the ordered probit regression.
The picture becomes clearer if we only regard the consistent data in the lower panel of
Figure 1.2. The regular lab treatment now shows the least risk aversion. The internet
treatment shows a slightly stronger risk aversion, although not significantly so in the
regression. Again, the lab high stakes treatment graphically shows most risk aversion,
this is also significant in the regression.
Table 1.5 shows the regression results. When comparing Model 2 (Consistent Data) to
Model 1 (All Data), we can see that the propensity to submit an inconsistent HL table
interacts with risk aversion. In the category “Field of Studies” both Law and “Other”
31Alternative approaches include using the most risk averse border or the middle of the curve. In some
sense, the expected effect of inconsistencies is maximized this way. There are about six A choices of a
representative individual. So there is a higher probability for a B choice at an unexpected decision row
than for an A choice.
32They make for 4.9% of the Internet participants and 0.83% of the laboratory participants. We can see
that the percentage of A-only participants relative to all inconsistent participants doubles when comparing
the lab (16.67%) to the Internet (34.11%). This result is most probably due to misunderstanding the
experimental rules and can be interpreted as further support for the claim that the experimenter loses
control in the Internet.
33The same set like in the probit analysis of inconsistent choices.
34There are differences, but they are never greater than 0.0005.
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Table 1.5: Ordered probit estimates (MSP) of likelihood to choose
lottery A - models with full demographics
Model 1 Model 2
All Data Consistent Data
Coefficient Std. Err. Coefficient Std. Err.
Internet -0.0013 (0.1399) 0.1668 (0.1435)
Lab High Stakes 0.2957 (0.1953) 0.3746* (0.2016)
Female -0.0190 (0.0420) 0.0501 (0.0447)
Age (at begin of studies) -0.0090 (0.0081) -0.0035 (0.0089)
Semester 0.0111** (0.0054) 0.0027 (0.0056)
Field of studies
Economics 0.0884 (0.0599) 0.0749 (0.0619)
Engineering 0.0576 (0.0807) 0.1215 (0.0848)
Natural Science 0.2958*** (0.0807) 0.3443*** (0.0902)
Law -0.0136 (0.0884) 0.2084** (0.0959)
Other 0.0453 (0.0516) 0.1832*** (0.0544)
Home country
China -0.0299 (0.2063) 0.0609 (0.2213)
Turkey -0.1926 (0.2143) 0.0977 (0.2433)
Russia 0.1079 (0.2209) 0.1964 (0.2390)
Poland 0.0844 (0.2297) 0.1716 (0.2438)
Bulgaria 0.3981 (0.3461) 0.4620 (0.3687)
Ukraine 0.1036 (0.2869) 0.4918 (0.3297)
Kazakhstan 0.1955 (0.3233) 0.1205 (0.3242)
Other -0.1577* (0.0891) 0.1130 (0.1008)
Charge of expenses
Parents 0.0198 (0.0602) 0.0685 (0.0639)
Spouse -0.0874 (0.2056) -0.0117 (0.2281)
Other 0.0747 (0.0979) 0.1420 (0.1050)
Marital status
Married -0.1101 (0.1468) -0.0671 (0.1596)
Other -0.2070* (0.1157) 0.0214 (0.1281)
cut1 -2.0472 (0.2412) -2.1774 (0.2649)
cut2 -1.6460 (0.2382) -2.1579 (0.2643)
cut3 -1.5364 (0.2377) -2.0567 (0.2615)
cut4 -1.3036 (0.2369) -1.4752 (0.2543)
cut5 -0.7018 (0.2360) -0.5566 (0.2520)
cut6 -0.3474 (0.2357) -0.1360 (0.2517)
cut7 0.2201 (0.2358) 0.4830 (0.2518)
cut8 0.8370 (0.2364) 1.1346 (0.2525)
cut9 1.3107 (0.2375) 1.6198 (0.2536)
Log likelihood -5,503 -4,561
Number of obs 2,709 2,460
LR χ2(23) 36.77 37.82
Prob > χ2 0.0343 0.0267
Pseudo R2 0.0033 0.0041
Notes: *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, re-
spectively. The baseline category is “Laboratory”. Omitted variables are the ones
with the highest frequency in their respective class: Business Administration (field
of studies), Germany (home country), Self (charge of expenses), Single (marital
status). In Model 2, only data from consistent choice profiles are included.
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Figure 1.2: Predicted safe choices
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turn from an insignificant to an increased and significantly positive coefficient, meaning
higher risk aversion. Both fields of studies had a high and significant increased prob-
ability to submit an inconsistent HL table. An analogue effect can be found for the
coefficient of “Other” home country. It turns from being significantly negative to insignif-
icantly positive. This category also had a highly increased probability of submitting an
inconsistent HL table. So we can see that inconsistency had the effect we described in
Section refs:rd:inconsistency – it reduces the measured risk aversion.
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When focusing on the number of safe choices as the dependent variable in our analysis,
our main results are essentially identical to the analysis of the MSP. Furthermore, the
increased risk aversion of the laboratory high stakes data is already significant in the
regression results of the entire dataset. This robustness check lets us be confident of the
quality of our results. All results of the ordered probit analysis for the number of safe
choices can be found in the appendix.
Summarizing the ordered probit analysis, we do not find meaningful differences between
the regular stakes lab treatment and the Internet treatment. Significant differences in
risk aversion can be found for the lab high stakes data. This can be seen graphically as
well as in the magnitude and the significance of the coefficients in the regressions. As a
main message we can say that there seems to be no difference in risk aversion between
the regular stakes lab treatment and the Internet treatment. However, lab subjects in the
high stakes treatment behave in accordance to expectations more risk aversely.
Therefore, the ordered probit analysis strengthens our main results of the nonparametric
tests. This analysis also gives us more information in the sense that they detect the higher
risk aversion of the laboratory high stakes participants.
Interval Regressions
As a final test we run interval regressions. The dependent variable is the risk aversion
coefficient r in this constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) utility function:
U(x) =

x(1−r)
1−r for r 6= 1
ln x for r = 1
(1.1)
An r > 0 represents risk aversion, an r = 0 risk neutrality, and an r < 0 risk love. So the
greater the regression coefficient the greater the risk aversion (the smaller the risk love),
and the smaller the coefficient the smaller the risk aversion (the greater the risk love).
We use the intervals of the CRRA coefficient for each participant, displayed in the last
column of Table 1.1. In order to use all data and not only the consistent data, we allow
37
Internet Payment
the intervals to be broader than the ones in the table. The choice which determines the
minimal r coefficient is the first chosen B lottery and the choice which determines the
maximal r is the last chosen A lottery. This way we can regard subjects that switched
from B to A, switched more than once, and even subjects who chose A in each row.
A subject, who chose A in the first two rows, B in the third row, again A in the fourth row,
and finally B in all subsequent rows would be assigned to the interval [−0.95; 0.15]. The
same subject, however, would be excluded from the analysis of consistent participants. A
subject with B choices throughout would have a coefficient in the interval (−∞;−1.71].
A subject with A choices throughout is assigned a coefficient in the interval [1.37;∞) just
like a subject with A choices in rows 1 to 9 and a B choice in the last row. Although
this is formally not correct, we employ this approach in order to use all data in the first
model. As usual, we also run the whole analysis with consistent data only (and thereby
do not use the pure A choice participants).
In this approach we begin to put structure on the data. We assume EUT and the specified
CRRA utility function to be valid for every participant. As mentioned before, an increas-
ing body of literature is showing that people cannot easily be assigned to a certain utility
function. Often enough, a population is split into groups of different classes as in Harrison
et al. (2010) or even one individual behaves according to different functions in different
situations as in Harrison and Rutström (2009). With the help of the intervals (of flexible
size) we leave wiggle room for the data to fit into the regression parameters and let the
data speak for itself. Par for the course of the stronger assumptions, the results are not as
strong as our previous results but still in line with them. In this context, it makes sense
to have a closer look at the consistent data. This data is closer to strict EUT-generated
data than the entire dataset. Thereby, we reduce the number of datapoints that are not
strictly in line with EUT and more probably derived from a EUT-incompatible utility
function. Table 1.6 summarizes the results.
In the whole dataset, laboratory high stakes has a positive regression coefficient indicating
an increased risk aversion. Internet - in contrast to our previous findings - has a substantial
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Table 1.6: Interval regression estimates of CRRA coefficient - models
with full demographics
Model 1 Model 2
All Data Consistent Data
Coefficient Std. Err. Coefficient Std. Err.
Constant 0.4826*** (0.1185) 0.5113*** (0.1330)
Internet 0.1298 (0.0807) 0.0775 (0.0760)
Lab High Stakes 0.1689 (0.1136) 0.1772* (0.1068)
Female 0.0453* (0.0245) 0.0309 (0.0237)
Age (at begin of studies) -0.0027 (0.0048) -0.0038 (0.0047)
Semester 0.0000 (0.0031) 0.0011 (0.0030)
Field of studies
Economics 0.0344 (0.0344) 0.0281 (0.0328)
Engineering 0.0755 (0.0471) 0.0596 (0.0449)
Natural Science 0.1850*** (0.0496) 0.1759*** (0.0477)
Law 0.1229** (0.0525) 0.1080** (0.0508)
Other 0.0946*** (0.0300) 0.0893*** (0.0288)
Home country
China -0.0407 (0.1215) -0.0153 (0.1173)
Turkey -0.0160 (0.1267) 0.0521 (0.1287)
Russia 0.1390 (0.1269) 0.0590 (0.1266)
Poland 0.0337 (0.1383) 0.0873 (0.1293)
Bulgaria 0.2116 (0.2055) 0.2187 (0.1951)
Ukraine 0.1721 (0.1780) 0.2811 (0.1757)
Kazakhstan 0.0048 (0.1859) 0.0480 (0.1724)
Other 0.1089 (0.0528) 0.0596 (0.0533)
Charge of expenses
Parents 0.0370 (0.0351) 0.0300 (0.0339)
Spouse 0.0492 (0.1205) 0.0082 (0.1209)
Other 0.0496 (0.0585) 0.0861 (0.0557)
Marital status
Married -0.0071 (0.0858) -0.0438 (0.0846)
Other -0.0225 (0.0708) -0.0031 (0.0678)
ln(σ) -0.5534*** (0.0157) -0.6312*** (0.0158)
σ 0.5750 (0.0090) 0.5319 (0.0084)
Log likelihood -5,176 -4,799
Number of obs 2,803 2,460
LR χ2(23) 39.67 37.58
Prob > χ2 0.0167 0.0283
left-censored obs 31 18
uncensored obs 0 0
right-censored obs 476 225
interval obs 2,296 2,217
Notes: *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, re-
spectively. The baseline category is “Laboratory”. Omitted variables are the ones
with the highest frequency in their respective class: Business Administration (field
of studies), Germany (home country), Self (charge of expenses), Single (marital
status). In Model 2, only data from consistent choice profiles are included.
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positive coefficient. However, both coefficients are not significantly different from 0. This
finding changes if we take a look at the consistent data only. The coefficient of Internet is
reduced by 50% and stays insignificant. To the contrary, the coefficient of lab high stakes
is slightly increased and now significantly greater than 0. In both datasets the dummies
for natural sciences, law, and “Other” categories of studies show a significant increase in
risk aversion compared to the omitted category (business administration). Similar effects
have been found in the ordered probit analysis (for both switching point and number of
safe choices). The interval regression analysis of the whole dataset is the only analysis
in which we find the usual effect of women being more risk averse than men. We cannot
find this effect in the ordered probit analysis (MSP and safe choices) for the whole and
the consistent dataset and also not in the interval regression for the consistent subset of
data. Overall, we do not find support in our data for risk attitudes differing by sex, just
like Harrison et al. (2007b).35
Overall, our results lead us to a similarity of risk aversion in the lab regular stakes treat-
ment and the Internet treatment. This is shown in nonparametric tests, in the ordered
probit analysis, and in the interval regression analysis. The lab high stakes data shows
a higher risk aversion than the lab regular stakes data. Graphically, the lab high stakes
data also shows a higher risk aversion than the Internet data. This is supported by a
post-estimation test in the MSP ordered probit analysis of the entire dataset. However,
this result cannot be replicated in post-estimation tests of the ordered probit regression of
the consistent data, the number of safe choices ordered probit regression (entire dataset
& consistent dataset), or the interval regression analysis. The pattern of the test results
hints to the more prevalent inconsistencies in the Internet data as a reason.
Result 4 [Risk Aversion]
(a) Our Internet data does not show a different level of risk aversion than the laboratory
regular stakes data does. Neither for the entire dataset nor for the consistent-only dataset.
35For an extensive overview on conditions under which this pattern shows up, see Eckel and Grossman
(2008).
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(b) The laboratory high stakes data shows significantly higher risk aversion.
Result 5 [Risk Aversion]
Compared to the lab high stakes treatment, our Internet data does not show lower risk
aversion.
Experimental Costs
Of practical interest to all experimenters are the costs relative to the quality and quantity
of the data. Does it really make sense for the researcher to leave the lab? Is the loss
of control overcompensated by more observations? This part of the analysis relates the
costs and the number of participants to each other. In this analysis we focus on expected
participant payments and assume that the paying researcher is also only interested in
expected costs of the experiment.
Most important for us is the comparison of the Internet and the regular lab stakes data.
In the Internet treatment we gathered 60 times as many participants as in the the lab
regular stakes treatment (3,582 vs. 60). Focusing on the consistent participants, we
gathered 54 times as many as in the lab regular stakes treatment (3,069 vs. 57). So the
remarkable increase in participant numbers clearly overcompensated via statistical power
(and broader demographics) for the increase in costs, whether they are monetary (we paid
more participants in the lab than online) or in the form of data quality (we found more
inconsistent behavior online).36
Result 6 [Experimental Costs]
The Internet provides the researcher with a greatly increased number of participants.
Potential higher monetary costs for higher stakes or paying more participants or costs in
36Please note that we assume a not too strongly decreasing marginal utility in the number of observa-
tions for the researcher. The curvature of the researcher’s utility function in the number of participants
is dependent on the method of analysis, the researcher’s preferences etc. and can be configured or is well-
known by the researcher in advance of the experiment. We also abstain from including the recruitment
and programming costs into our analysis as they are as well highly dependent on the specific researcher’s
options and preferences.
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terms of data quality loss are overcompensated by remarkably higher statistical power.
1.6 Conclusions
As a general result we do not find different elicited risk attitudes in our regular stakes labo-
ratory treatment and the Internet. We would have drawn the same conclusions regardless
whether we conducted the experiment in the lab or in our online setting. When we also
take a look at the high stakes laboratory treatment, we observe more risk aversion than
in the regular stakes lab and Internet treatments. This is consistent with standard theory
and the result one would expect according to the literature discussed in Section 1.2.1.
When comparing the lab high stakes treatment to the Internet treatment (which have
identical stakes) we see that the risk aversion in the Internet is lower than in the labora-
tory. Possible explanations include that Internet participants discount the stakes in some
way or that a selection bias (through a positive correlation to ambiguity aversion) lets
relatively more risk tolerant participants enter the experiment.
The latter point is important to stress. We do not obtain similar results for lab high
stakes and Internet data although they employ identical stake sizes. The researcher has to
adjust the stake sizes accordingly when leaving the lab. To what magnitude “accordingly”
translates in such an environment (are our five times scaling up always the best idea?)
and which factors influence this magnitude (ambiguity, payment insecurity, opportunity
costs etc.) is left for future research.
We find more inconsistently completed HL tables online than in the laboratory. But
we can also show that the increased inconsistency frequency is overcompensated by a
strongly increased number of participants. The Internet helps to motivate more people to
participate than a comparable lab experiment which has an upper bound of participants
through time and lab space.
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So we conclude that it is feasible to run lab kind experiments online, if the researcher
increases the stake size. Nevertheless, Internet experiments still lack the degree of control
a lab experiment can offer. This is verified in generally noisier data and less risk aversion
compared to similar stakes in the laboratory. Laboratory experiments are still the gold
standard in terms of control. Future research has to explore the extent to which our
results are applicable to other experimental research domains. More complex individual
decision problems are a natural choice.
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1.7 Appendix
1.7.1 Screenshots
Figure 1.3: Screenshot of the Registration Page
44
Internet Payment
Figure 1.4: Screenshot of the Risk Aversion Elicitation Page
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Figure 1.5: Screenshot of the Risk Aversion Elicitation Page
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1.7.2 Ordered Probit Regression with Number of Safe Choices
We now take a look at the results of the ordered probit analysis of the number of safe
choices. Note, that in this analysis we implicitly sort the data like HL. All A choices are
assumed to be before all B choices. The graphs are slightly different from the graphs
of the switching point analysis. Figure 1.6 (upper panel) shows the results of all data.
Lab and Internet are not virtually identical any more but still not significantly different
in the regression results. Table 1.7 shows the regression results. All main results are
essentially identical for the analysis of the whole dataset. The most important result
is even strengthened as the lab high stakes data already shows significantly more risk
aversion in the entire dataset.
Contrary to the MSP analysis, there are hardly any differences between the entire and the
consistent dataset, neither in the graph nor in the regression table. This is straightforward
– the impact of inconsistently completed HL tables is minimized by the ordering of A and
B choices already.37 So we do not expect analyzes that compare an entire dataset to a
consisted subset by the method of counting safe choices to yield any substantial differences.
Maier and Rüger (2011) do this in a side note of their analysis and in line with our analysis
do not find significant differences.
For the analysis of the consistent data, all results are actually identical between MSP and
number of safe choices, as there is no inconsistent data to be treated differently. We can
see this by comparing the respective Model 2 of Table 1.5 and Table 1.7. Graphically,
we can see this from the respective lower panel of Figure 1.2 and Figure 1.6 which are
identical.
37Given the regular pattern of HL table choices, a B choice has the biggest impact in one of the lower
number rows. However, it is forced to come up in the higher number rows by the sorting method.
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Table 1.7: Ordered probit estimates (Number of safe choices) of like-
lihood to choose lottery A - models with full demographics
Model 1 Model 2
All Data Consistent Data
Coefficient Std. Err. Coefficient Std. Err.
Internet 0.1571 (0.1406) 0.1668 (0.1435)
Lab High Stakes 0.4073** (0.1965) 0.3746** (0.2016)
Female 0.0294 (0.0422) 0.0501 (0.0447)
Age (at begin of studies) -0.0069 (0.0081) -0.0035 (0.0089)
Semester 0.0036 (0.0054) 0.0027 (0.0056)
Field of studies
Economics 0.0840 (0.0602) 0.0749 (0.0619)
Engineering 0.1290 (0.0812) 0.1215 (0.0848)
Natural Science 0.3464*** (0.0866) 0.3443*** (0.0902)
Law 0.1198 (0.0887) 0.2084** (0.0959)
Other 0.1278** (0.0518) 0.1832*** (0.0544)
Home country
China 0.0310 (0.2072) 0.0609 (0.2213)
Turkey -0.1021 (0.2155) 0.0977 (0.2433)
Russia 0.2392 (0.2228) 0.1964 (0.2390)
Poland 0.1816 (0.2309) 0.1716 (0.2438)
Bulgaria 0.6493 (0.3525) 0.4620 (0.3687)
Ukraine 0.3170 (0.2874) 0.4918 (0.3297)
Kazakhstan 0.1621 (0.3239) 0.1205 (0.3242)
Other 0.0166 (0.0894) 0.1130 (0.1008)
Charge of expenses
Parents 0.0641 (0.0604) 0.0685 (0.0639)
Spouse -0.0697 (0.2066) -0.0117 (0.2281)
Other 0.1129 (0.0982) 0.1420 (0.1050)
Marital status
Married -0.1072 (0.1473) -0.0671 (0.1596)
Other -0.0309 (0.1161) 0.0214 (0.1281)
cut1 -2.3244 (0.2043) -2.1774 (0.2649)
cut2 -2.2520 (0.2016) -2.1579 (0.2643)
cut3 -2.1363 (0.1980) -2.0567 (0.2615)
cut4 -1.5745 (0.1899) -1.4752 (0.2543)
cut5 -0.6709 (0.1869) -0.5566 (0.2520)
cut6 -0.1854 (0.1866) -0.1360 (0.2517)
cut7 0.4242 (0.1865) 0.4830 (0.2518)
cut8 1.0608 (0.1871) 1.1346 (0.2525)
cut9 1.5275 (0.1882) 1.6198 (0.2536)
Log likelihood -5,043 -4,561
Number of obs 2,709 2,460
LR χ2(23) 35.53 37.82
Prob > χ2 0.0460 0.0267
Pseudo R2 0.0035 0.0041
Notes: *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, re-
spectively. The baseline category is “Laboratory”. Omitted variables are the ones
with the highest frequency in their respective class: Business Administration (field
of studies), Germany (home country), Self (charge of expenses), Single (marital
status). In Model 2, only data from consistent choice profiles are included.
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Figure 1.6: Predicted safe choices
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Chapter 2
What Makes them Tick
Beliefs, Risk Aversion, and Final
Prices in Prediction Markets0
2.1 Introduction
Explicit prediction markets exist for about 25 years and have steadily gained attention
within the public and the economics profession. Through their final price they provide
sound advice for the forecast of the respective future event. They are also usually better
than most other forecasting tools. Up to now, the majority of the literature focuses
on the application and the performance of such markets. Our focus is on the research
regarding the price formation. This strand of literature identifies traders’ beliefs and
their risk aversion as the two most important driving factors of a prediction market’s final
price. But this literature relies mainly on theoretical analyses or simulated data for belief
distributions and assumed utility functions for traders. Empirical data is only marginally
used.
We add data generated in actual prediction markets – not through simulations – to this
0This chapter is based on joint work with Ben Greiner and Anthony Ziegelmeyer.
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strand of literature. Our markets were set up during the 2006 FIFA Soccer World Cup.
The uncertain events to be predicted were the outcome of each of the matches. Each match
had one independent market. We introduce the distinction between the (theoretical)
equilibrium price and the (empirical) final price of a market. With our dataset of risk
aversion, beliefs, and final prediction market prices we can compare the mean belief, the
equilibrium price, and the final price on a market.
Our results support the prevalent notion of no relevant differences between mean belief
and equilibrium price. Furthermore, our final prices exhibit a considerable difference
to the equilibrium prices. Additionally, in our markets, the final prices are the worst
predictive statistics and are outperformed by the mean belief. Our contribution to the
literature is the distinction between final and equilibrium price as well as the comparison
of the predictive power of mean belief, equilibrium price, and final price.
Prediction markets are based in the general belief of economists that information is in-
corporated into markets through the price mechanism. This way, markets can aggregate
(private) information that is dispersed across market participants. Hayek (1945) was the
first one to write about this feature of markets. He describes the market as an infor-
mation gathering system which displays relevant information to the market participants.
The author gives the example of an increased tin market price. A trader does not need
to know whether supply decreased or demand increased. The only relevant information
to him is that the scarcity of tin has changed and this in turn increased the price in order
to bring market supply and demand back to equilibrium.
But the price mechanism is not only useful for gathering information on current states of
the world. It can also gather information on future states of the world as long as there are
information and/or expectations available at present. Generally spoken, the price of any
security in which contracting, payment, and delivery of the underlying do not take place
at the same point in time (partly) reveals the contracting parties’ information and beliefs
about the future. With a market of fair thickness this information about the future should
be incorporated into the current market price through trading. An example is given by
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Roll (1984): He shows that prices of orange juice futures could not be predicted with the
aid of weather forecasts (once it was controlled for institutional limits of price movement).
An overview of experimental work considering the “Hayek Hypothesis” is given in Smith
(1982).
Information aggregation in prices through trades is a prerequisite for the efficient mar-
ket hypothesis (EMH). According to the EMH, an informationally efficient market is a
market that reflects all information at the respective point in time through its prices. For-
mal foundations of this hypothesis emerged in Samuelson (1973) and Mandelbrot (1966).
Among others, Fama (1965a), Fama (1965b), and Fama et al. (1969) further developed
the EMH, until it was comprehensively presented in Fama (1970). Such a strong state-
ment like the EMH sparked an extensive discussion on the efficiency of markets and the
general possibility of efficient markets, which included Grossman (1976), Jensen (1978),
Tirole (1982), and the seminal paper of Grossman and Stiglitz (1980). Literature reviews
are Farmer and Lo (1999), and Malkiel (2003). Nowadays, the EMH is widely accepted
as a “benchmark” (Fama, 1991) for the analysis of price movements on financial markets.
The EMH was incorporated into the development of markets that had the sole purpose
of generating a forecast about future events. The first paper on this subject was Forsythe
et al. (1992). In 1988, a prediction market1 was implemented at the University of Iowa in
order to predict the winner of the upcoming presidential election of George Bush (Senior)
and Michael Dukakis.2 Currently, the name of this platform is “Iowa Electronic Markets”
(IEM)3 and it is the oldest academical prediction market institution. The forecast gained
from this market was strikingly accurate and outperformed opinion polls as the alternative
forecasting instrument. Its essential design set a standard and is nowadays employed in
all other prediction markets. Each potential outcome of a future event is assigned one
respective contract that pays money related to the realization of the underlying outcome.
1Alternative names include “news futures”, “information markets”, and “forecasting markets”.
2To be semantically correct, these markets deliver “forecasts”, not “predictions”. “Prediction” implies
the eventual realization of the predicted outcome. This is not always true for prediction markets. Like
in the literature of prediction markets we will use these terms interchangeably.
3http://tippie.uiowa.edu/iem/index.cfm
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These contracts can be freely traded on a double auction platform. Resulting prices deliver
information of the estimated probability of occurrence. Although the average trader in
Forsythe et al. (1992) exhibited (judgement) biases, the market worked well. The authors
identify the “marginal traders” as the reason for the positive market performance. These
traders were defined as exhibiting overproportionally frequent final price setting behavior.
The average marginal trader invested more money than the average non-marginal trader,
had a higher return on his invested money, showed a more successful trading strategy
conditional on news quality, and was less prone to biases.
From that point of time, prediction markets have been frequently implemented not only
to predict election outcomes. Commercial prediction markets include the Hollywood
Stock Exchange4, which focuses on movie related underlyings and the commercial leader
Intrade5, which covers a broad variety of events like elections, gasoline prices, and the
discovery of a supersymmetric particle.6 Prediction markets are still regularly set up for
academic research. The IEM are the most frequent academic markets. Even companies
like HP, Siemens, and Pfizer began to use prediction markets in order to aggregate in-
formation to improve decision making processes. Usually, these markets forecast sales
figures like in Chen and Plott (2002).
The majority of research on prediction markets is on the astonishing accuracy, support-
ing the thesis that such a prediction market price usually constitutes the best available
forecasting instrument. As in Berg et al. (1996) and Oliven and Rietz (2004), the re-
search focus of this strand of literature is on generating knowledge on design elements
which enhance prediction markets’ forecasts. For example, this research tries to identify
demographic characteristics of the marginal trader. Knowing more about him seems to
be key to understand the mechanism through which prediction markets perform so well.
The focus of the second strand of literature is different. It is on characteristics of the
4http://www.hsx.com/
5http://www.intrade.com
6Essentially, all betting markets are implicitly also prediction markets. They provide similar incen-
tives. Therefore one can derive predictions from betting quotas.
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entire set of market participants, with beliefs and risk aversion as the two most important
dimensions.
Manski (2006) shows that for risk-neutral traders with heterogeneous beliefs the final
price gives merely partial information on the central tendency of beliefs. His results
triggered further theoretical and data-based literature. Adams (2006) adds a different
kind of learning than Manski to Manski’s model and concludes that this makes the final
price converge to the mean of beliefs. Gjerstad (2005) theoretically demonstrates that
traders’ risk aversion and their beliefs can be important drivers of the final price. In
his theoretical analysis he concludes that for empirically validated degrees of relative
risk aversion and “plausible” belief distributions, the equilibrium price is “very near the
traders’ mean belief”. This is corroborated by Wolfers and Zitzewitz (2007). They develop
a parsimonious model and test it with simulated data for utility functions and belief
distributions as well as with field data from prediction markets and sports betting markets.
They also find that “prediction markets prices typically provide useful (albeit sometimes
biased) estimates of average beliefs about the probability an event occurs”. Similarly,
in their analysis of simulated belief data Fountain and Harrison (2011) find equilibrium
prices in markets with traders with log or CRRA utility functions to be rather close to
the mean belief as long as the belief distribution is unimodal and trader characteristics
like wealth and time preferences are orthogonal to beliefs. The focus of Ottaviani and
Sørensen (2012) is rather on testing financial asset pricing theories in a dynamic setting,
but their model can be interpreted as the most general prediction market model so far. It
also includes information gathering of the traders through other sources than the market.
Contrary to the other papers, they regard a marginal trader. They find under-reaction
of the equilibrium price to information if traders have an investment limit or DARA risk
preferences.
Schmidt and Werwatz (2002) set up prediction markets in the context of the UEFA
European Soccer Championship 2000. These markets outperformed quotas from an online
betting platform and a random predictor. Unpublished work on soccer prediction markets
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include markets at CREED of the University of Amsterdam for the 1994 FIFA Soccer
World Cup and markets at the Humboldt University of Berlin for the 1998 FIFA Soccer
World Cup.
Finding out how prices on prediction markets are generated not only helps us to discover
how these markets work. Through the similarity of prediction markets to regular double
auction markets, analyzing these markets also aids our understanding of market price
formation in general. Prediction markets have the advantage of richer datasets on traders
and prices as usual financial markets. They also reveal the fundamental value of a contract
at a certain point of time in contrast to many assets on regular financial markets.
Our experiment is the first study to analyze the interplay of risk aversion and beliefs with
the aid of data elicited from human traders. We set up prediction markets which give us
final prices to analyze. Additionally, we elicited the participants’ risk aversion and beliefs.
All other studies of the related strand of literature either relied on theoretical analyses or
used (partly) artificially created datasets. Data created in actual prediction markets was
never used in more but a supplementary way in this strand of literature. Furthermore,
no study so far analyzes a dataset as exhaustive as ours.
2.2 Research Design
2.2.1 General Setup
Our research question required the elicitation of the participants’ risk aversion, their
beliefs about the underlying events and the results of prediction markets. Details of the
general setup and the risk elicitation procedure are described in the first chapter of this
thesis. We will focus on the main design elements as well as the belief elicitation procedure
and the prediction markets themselves.
Following our research question, there were three incentivized tasks for the participants.
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The first one was the HL table, the second one was the submission of probabilistic beliefs
of match outcomes and the third one was the trading on prediction markets. Five partic-
ipants were paid according to their choices in the risk elicitation task, another five were
paid according to their beliefs, and another 20 were paid according to their performance
in one prediction market. A participant who was selected for payment would only be paid
for one of the three tasks. To suppress hedging motives, this was clearly stated in the
instructions.
The FIFA Soccer World Cup 2006 was a big event which generated dozens of smaller
events with uncertain outcomes – the single matches. We recruited 3,582 participants
which were allocated across 16 matching groups. A registering participant was allocated to
the matching group with the least number of participants and randomly if there was more
than one matching group. This way we achieved similar participant numbers across all
matching groups. Eight matching groups had classical double-auction prediction markets
as the trading platform. Participants of the other eight matching groups traded on pari-
mutuel betting markets. This analysis focuses on the double auction markets to which
1,790 participants were allocated.
64 matches were played in this world cup. We set up a market for each of the matches and
each of the matching groups, which gives us 512 markets overall. The first 48 matches
were played in a group stage (first round) in which each match of Team A vs. Team B
had three possible outcomes: Team A wins, Team B wins, tie. Team A can also be called
“Team of record”. The 16 matches of the following playoff stage (second round) did not
include “tie” as a possible outcome. Matches of the second round were not ended before
a winner was determined.7 In this analysis we only regard games of the second stage as
the entire prediction market literature focuses on markets with two outcomes. Analyzing
7A game lasted two times 45 minutes, plus extra time of two times 15 minutes if no winner was
determined after 90 minutes, plus a penalty shootout if no winner was determined after extra time.
Extra time and penalty shootout were only used in the second stage. The exact rules of the FIFA
tournament can be found under this stable URL:
http://eur.i1.yimg.com/eur.yimg.com/i/eu/fifa/regen.pdf
More information can be gathered on the FIFA homepage:
http://www.fifa.com
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markets with more than two assets will be left for future research.
We chose the world cup as the uncertainty generating event, because of a high soccer
interest in Germany. This interest was even strengthened as Germany was the host
country of the world cup. Many people would have different opinions about the matches,
which motivates participation in the experiment and trading on the respective markets. As
stressed by Wolfers and Zitzewitz (2004) and Snowberg et al. (2012) this is an important
prerequisite to generate “thick” markets and actually incorporate information into the
market prices.
Any person could register on the homepage of the experiment.8 During the registration
process, participants submitted their name, e-mail address, a username and a password.
Afterwards we elicited their risk aversion through a multiple price list (MPL) designed
by Holt and Laury (2002) (HL) and described in detail in the first chapter of this thesis.
The registration procedure was completed by a questionnaire for demographical data.
Mandatory information were sex and home country. All participants selected for payment
were informed via e-mail and paid by wire transfer after the World Cup final.
After the registration process the participants were free to enter any market. Before
a participant could enter a market we elicited his beliefs about the probabilities of the
two potential match outcomes via a linear scoring rule. Past submission he entered the
market. In order to increase the number of entered markets we implemented an “eight
markets rule”. If one participant was randomly determined for payment according to his
market performance, the number of his entered markets was checked. Had he entered at
least eight markets, one of these would be randomly chosen for payment. Had he entered
less than eight markets, dummy markets with a performance of 0e to sum up to eight
markets were employed.
8www.torlabor.de
57
What Makes them Tick
2.2.2 Markets
Our market design closely follows the established design of the IEM. A market for a
respective match usually opened 74 hours and ended 2 hours before the scheduled starting
time of the respective match. So the usual trading time was 72 hours. Because of the tight
schedule of the world cup, the teams of three second round matches were not determined
early enough for such a runtime. These markets ran for 66 hours.
On every market, each trader received an endowment of 100e but no contracts. Each
possible outcome of the match was assigned an Arrow-Debreu-security.9 The underlying
events of these securities were mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive. A security
would pay 1e if the event occurred and 0e otherwise. At any point during the runtime
of the respective market, traders could buy and sell “bundles” from and to the bank. A
bundle contained one of each kind of securities, had the constant price of 1e throughout
the runtime of the market and could only be traded with the bank. Single securities could
only be traded among the market participants. Neither money nor shares were transferable
between markets for a certain trader. It was also impossible to transfer money or shares
directly from one trader to another. The securities could be freely traded on a double
auction platform in price increments of 0.01e. A negative account balance, short selling,
and creating new securities were impossible. Trading was not mandatory. Participants
could enter the market and do nothing. This would ensure them with a payoff of 100e
in case they were drawn for payment according to their performance of this market.
The main difference of TorLabor to the IEM real money markets is that our participants
did not have to invest their own money but received an endowment for each entered
market. Many countries do not allow real-money prediction markets or have ambiguous
or unfavorable legal settings. Even if real-money prediction markets are in accordance
to the laws of the respective jurisdiction, often special permissions are advisable or nec-
9In finance, these securities are named “binary calls”. This is also how they are legally defined in
most cases. As such, they fall into the legal category of “options”. We called them “shares” throughout
the experiment in order to avoid confusion of the participants.
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essary for such markets. Regularly this also applies for zero-sum pure research markets
at universities. In fact, just recently (in November 2012) the US Commodity Futures
Trading Commission (CFTC) charged Dublin-based Intrade “with violating the CFTC’s
off-exchange options trading ban and filing false forms with the CFTC”. This effectively
bans USA residents from the platform.10 Arrow et al. (2008) propose reforms to simplify
the legal process of a prediction market setup.
To minimize legal issues, we refrained from setting up a real-money market. When a
participant was determined for payment according to a certain market, he was paid his
winnings on this respective market in actual money (exchange rate 1:1). Not using real
money of the traders themselves marks a departure from the usual incentivized prediction
market design. In case of influence on participant behavior this could confound our results.
However, Servan-Schreiber et al. (2004) and Slamka et al. (2008) did not find significantly
different performance of real-money and play-money markets. So we assume that our
markets perform similarly to real-money markets.
The equal endowment for each trader on each market not only had the practical benefit of
prevented jurisdictional problems. This design element also implemented an assumption
of the relevant prediction market literature – orthogonality of beliefs and trader wealth
at the beginning of a market. Traders were free to invest as much of their endowment as
they wished. But their wealth at the beginning of each market was set to 100e. Traders
could increase their wealth through successful trading during the market runtime and
therefore invest more than 100e eventually. But they started out as being equally rich.
10The CFTC’s press release can be found here:
http://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/PressReleases/pr6423-12
Intrade’s statement can be found here:
http://www.intrade.com/news/id/782
Intrade is currently searching for a way to solve the legal issues in order to continue to offer their service
to USA residents.
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Table 2.1: The ten paired lottery-choice decisions
CRRA coefficient if
row was last A choice,
Row Lottery A Lottery B EA − EB below all B choices
1 { 100e, 0.1 ; 80e, 0.9 } { 192.50e, 0.1 ; 5e, 0.9 } 58.25e [-1.71; -0.95]
2 { 100e, 0.2 ; 80e, 0.8 } { 192.50e, 0.2 ; 5e, 0.8 } 41.50e [-0.95; -0.49]
3 { 100e, 0.3 ; 80e, 0.7 } { 192.50e, 0.3 ; 5e, 0.7 } 24.75e [-0.49; -0.14]
4 { 100e, 0.4 ; 80e, 0.6 } { 192.50e, 0.4 ; 5e, 0.6 } 8.00e [-0.14; 0.15]
5 { 100e, 0.5 ; 80e, 0.5 } { 192.50e, 0.5 ; 5e, 0.5 } -8.75e [0.15; 0.41]
6 { 100e, 0.6 ; 80e, 0.4 } { 192.50e, 0.6 ; 5e, 0.4 } -25.50e [0.41; 0.68]
7 { 100e, 0.7 ; 80e, 0.3 } { 192.50e, 0.7 ; 5e, 0.3 } -42.25e [0.68; 0.97]
8 { 100e, 0.8 ; 80e, 0.2 } { 192.50e, 0.8 ; 5e, 0.2 } -59.00e [0.97; 1.37]
9 { 100e, 0.9 ; 80e, 0.1 } { 192.50e, 0.9 ; 5e, 0.1 } -75.75e [1.37; ∞)
10 { 100e, 1.0 ; 80e, 0.0 } { 192.50e, 1.0 ; 5e, 0.0 } -92.50e non-monotone
Notes: EA−EB denotes the expected payoff difference between lottery A and lottery B. Participants
were only shown the information of the first three columns. They had no explicit information on E
or the CRRA coefficient.
2.2.3 Risk Elicitation
The risk aversion elicitation procedure closely follows Holt and Laury (2002). We em-
ployed their “very high” payment scheme whilst replacing “$” with “euros”. Table 2.1
illustrates the payoff matrix presented to our subjects.11 This way, the potential payoffs
ranged from 5.00e to 192.50e with intermediate payoffs at 80e and 100e. Choosing
this range was guided by the aim to align the payoff range and the expected payoff of
random (respectively no) actions in all three tasks of the experiment. In case the abso-
lute values of the lotteries mattered for the elicitation of the subjects’ risk aversion, we
minimized confounds in our estimation with this strategy.
In each of the ten rows, a participant had to choose between lottery A and lottery B.
A rational risk neutral individual should pick lottery A in the first four rows and pick
lottery B in each consecutive row from row five on. Switching earlier is related to risk-
loving behavior, switching later is related to risk-averse behavior. Switching from lottery
B to lottery A in a subsequent row as well as choosing lottery A in row 10 is called
“inconsistent” behavior. For an extensive description and discussion of the risk elicitation
procedure as well as the estimation of individual parameters of risk aversion, see the first
11At the time of the experiment, 1e was worth about US$1.25.
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chapter of this thesis.
With the help of the results of this task we will estimate the risk aversion parameter of
the utility function. For the analysis we assume a power utility function with constant
relative risk aversion (CRRA). The utility function we use throughout the analysis is
characterized by:
U(x) =

x(1−r)
1−r for r 6= 1
ln x for r = 1
(2.1)
The parameter to be estimated for each individual is r. An r > 0 represents risk aversion,
an r = 0 risk neutrality, and an r < 0 risk love. In the data analysis we do not have to
consider cases of log utility as no participant has r = 1 in our estimations. The estimations
are conducted via interval regression and are described in the first chapter of this thesis.
2.2.4 Beliefs
Before entering a market, all participants had to report their beliefs of the likelihood
(their subjective probability)12 of each of the two teams winning the respective match.
The literature distinguishes between prior and posterior beliefs, which differ in the point
of time a trader holds them - before he enters the market or after the trading period of the
market has ended. According to this taxonomy, we elicited prior beliefs. Most theoretical
papers only regard posterior beliefs in their analysis. In this respect it would have been
preferable to elicit posterior beliefs. But for the market analysis we need belief data for at
least the vast majority of individuals who entered the respective market. Without their
beliefs, we would lose the entire market as an observation.
Incentives were given through a linear scoring rule. After a participant was randomly
chosen for payment according to his beliefs, one of his entered markets was randomly
chosen. The participant would be paid the percentage he had assigned to the eventual
outcome of 100e. On the one hand, such a linear scoring rule will let risk aversion play
12“Subjective probability” and “belief” will be used interchangeably throughout.
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a role in the submitted beliefs so that subjects usually do not report their true beliefs.
On the other hand, this rule is easy to understand. Alternatively, we could have used
a “proper” scoring rule. Such a rule reaches its maximum value at the true beliefs of
participants. It is “strictly proper” if this is the unique maximum. Quadratic scoring
rules are the most popular strictly proper scoring rules.13
However, proper scoring rules are not easily comprehensible for regular participants. Nel-
son and Bessler (1989) test this for a quadratic scoring rule in a set of risk neutral
participants. According to them, the rule requires practice rounds by the participants to
elicit true beliefs. More importantly, by construction it requires risk neutrality of the par-
ticipants. So even beliefs elicited by proper scoring rules usually have to be corrected for
risk aversion. Offerman et al. (2009) provide an extensive analysis and discussion of this
topic. Nelson and Bessler (1989) show that the forecaster’s subjective probabilities enter
the maximization problem linearly and therefore lead to corner solutions for risk-neutral
participants. All maximum beliefs are reported as any value of the interval [0, 1] (while
sufficing non-negativity for each belief and a unity sum) and all non-maximum beliefs are
reported as 0.
Andersen et al. (2010) discuss quadratic and linear scoring rules and compare probabilities
elicited by such rules. They do not find differences between the belief distributions after
correcting for risk.14 We did not expect our participants to be risk neutral and wanted to
maximize comprehension of the rule in order to foster participation. Therefore we chose
the linear scoring rule.
Formally, a linear scoring rule can be described in the following way. The true state
of nature has to be forecasted. There can be S different states of nature. s denotes a
single state of nature, so s ∈ (1, 2, . . . , S). All states of nature are mutually exclusive and
collectively exhaustive. qs denotes the forecasters stated probability for state s. This is the
figure that the researcher elicits from the subjects. We assume ps, qs ≥ 0 ∀ s , ∑Ss=1 ps = 1,
13Other examples include logarithmic and spherical scoring rules.
14It may still be the case that both scoring rules elicited the same “untrue” belief of a participant.
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and ∑Ss=1 qs = 1. A forecaster has the subjective probability vector (p1, p2, . . . , pS). His
stated probability vector is denoted by (q1, q2, . . . , qS). The payoff L (100e in our setting)
is multiplied by the stated probability of the eventual outcome (the true state). The
forecasters final payoff (FP) is computed by:
FP =
S∑
s=1
1A(s)Lqs ∈ [0, L] (2.2)
Where “1A(condition)” denotes the indicator function. It has value 1 if the stated con-
dition is true and 0 otherwise. The forecaster reaches the maximum payoff if he assigns
probability 1 to the eventual outcome and the minimum payoff if he assigns probability
0 to the eventual outcome.
The linear scoring rule does not elicit true beliefs of the participants for any utility function
other than log utility. Therefore, elicited beliefs of individuals without log utility must
be corrected for risk aversion in order to use them for further analyses with participants’
true beliefs. In the following, we describe the participants’ maximization problem and
derive functions to obtain subjective probabilities from stated probabilities.
The forecaster, for whom we assume probabilistic sophistication in the sense of Machina
and Schmeidler (1992), has to maximize his final payoff over his stated probabilities qs:
max
q1,q2,...,qS
S∑
s=1
psU(Lqs) s.t. qi ≥ 0∀ s = 1, 2, . . . , Sand
S∑
s=1
qs = 1 (2.3)
As long as not stated otherwise, we follow the majority of the theoretical prediction market
literature we discuss and will assume S = 2 in the further analysis. So we have:
max
q1,q2
2∑
s=1
psU(Lqs) s.t. qi ≥ 0∀ s = 1, 2and
2∑
s=1
qs = 1 (2.4)
This leads to:
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p1 =
U ′(Lq2)
U ′(Lq1) + U ′(Lq2)
= U
′(L(1− q1))
U ′(Lq1) + U ′(L(1− q1))
p2 = 1− p1
With our utility function (and r 6= 0) this can be reformulated to:
p1 =
(1− q1)(−r)
q
(−r)
1 + (1− q1)(−r)
(2.5)
p2 = 1− p1
We assume p1 = q1 if q1 ∈ {0, 1} for r > 0 and p1 = 1− q1 if q1 ∈ {0, 1} for r < 0. Here
we can see that log utility (r = 1) yields a truthful revelation of subjective probabilities.
According to Nelson and Bessler (1989), for p1 6= 0.5 we only receive extreme values (0
or 1) of q1 for risk neutral subjects (r = 0). Additionally, for p1 = 0.5 the forecaster
submits q1 ∈ [0, 1]. A risk neutral individual is indifferent between any two vectors of
stated probabilities if his p1 = 1/2.15 So instead of Function 2.5 the following applies:
p1 ∈ [0, 1] for q1 ∈ [0, 1]
p2 = 1− p1
Therefore we cannot learn anything from the stated probability of a participant.
However, if we assume that p1 = 0.5 iff q1 = 0.5. We can derive more information from
15The general result is verbally presented above.
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the stated probability:
p1 ∈

[0, 0.5) for q1 = 0
[0.5, 0.5] for q1 = 0.5
(0.5, 1] for q1 = 1
(2.6)
p2 = 1− p1
Still, from q1 we cannot derive more information on the individual’s belief but the relation
of p1 to 0.5.
The inverse functions of Function 2.5 and Function 2.6 are graphically illustrated in
Figure 2.1. This figure follows the usual presentation form of the literature, e.g. Offerman
et al. (2009) for a quadratic scoring rule. It is presented from the forecaster’s perspective
and displays q as a function of p, instead of p as a function of q like in the analysis above.
It also refrains from subscript s. As long as not necessary for comprehension we will drop
the subscript as well from here on.
As the graphs are point symmetric to (0.5, 0.5) we only discuss the cases in which p ≥ 0.5.
Results for p < 0.5 can be derived accordingly. A point on the identity line means that
stated probability and subjective probability coincide. This is true for all graphs at
p = 0.5, by assumption for risk neutral subjects.
A very risk averse subject (defined by r > 1 and depicted with r = 2 in our graphical
example) states probabilities biased towards 0.5. So q < p and q > 0.5 for p > 0.5. His
stated probabilities have to be corrected towards 1. As mentioned before, a subject with
log utility will state true probabilities – his graph matches the identity line. A slightly
risk averse subject (defined by 0 < r < 1 and depicted with r = 0.5) states probabilities
biased towards 1. So q > p and q > 0.5 for p > 0.5. His stated probabilities have to be
corrected towards 0.5. A risk neutral subject delivers probabilities of 1 for p > 0.5. Apart
from p = 0.5 (by assumption), it is impossible to derive his true probabilities with the aid
of his utility function and his stated beliefs. For risk averse and risk neutral subjects the
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Figure 2.1: stated probability vs. subjective probability in a linear scoring rule for different
degrees of constant relative risk aversion
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Notes: Each graph depicts the transformation of subjective into stated probability for one degree of
constant relative risk aversion. VRA stands for very risk averse, Log Utility is the case for r=1, SRA
stands for slightly risk averse, RN means risk neutral, SRL means slightly risk loving, MRL is for medium
risk loving, and VRL for very risk loving.
relation of the probability towards 0.5 is always identical before and after correction.
The latter property is flipped for risk loving subjects (r < 0). The relation of the proba-
bility towards 0.5 is after correction always the opposite of what it was before correction
(apart from p = q = 0.5). So a risk loving subject always states a probability q < 0.5
for the event he actually rates as more likely (p > 0.5) than the complementary event.
Slightly risk loving subjects (defined by 0 > r > −1 and depicted with r = −0.5) submit
probabilities biased towards 0. Therefore, q < p and q < 1 − p and q < 0.5 for p > 0.5.
An individual with r = −1 states the subjective probability of the complementary event.
q = 1− p and q < 0.5 for p > 0.5. A very risk loving individual (defined by r < −1 and
depicted with r = −2) states probabilities biased towards 0 as well. q < p and q > 1− p
and q < 0.5 for p > 0.5. The stated beliefs of all risk loving participants have to be
corrected towards 1.
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The translation function graphs approach the horizontal line at q = 0.5 when r approaches
∞ or −∞. The extreme points for p ∈ {0, 1} never change. So as an artefact, for extreme
risk aversion and extreme risk love, the graphs approach each other.
2.3 Hypotheses
Following the research of Gjerstad (2005), Wolfers and Zitzewitz (2007), and Fountain and
Harrison (2011) we set up the hypothesis that the final prices of the prediction markets are
not substantially different from the mean belief of the subjects who entered the market.
Hypothesis 1 [MSB vs. MCB vs. EP]
There are no substantial differences between the mean corrected belief and the equilibrium
price.
Up to now, the literature regards the equilibrium price as the final price. It does not
discuss the potential of differences between these prices but implicitly or explicitly assumes
that these prices are identical. This leads to our second hypothesis.
Hypothesis 2 [MCB vs. EP vs. FP]
There are no differences between the equilibrium price and the final price.
There is no established literature comparing the predictive accuracy of the mean stated
belief, the mean corrected belief, the equilibrium price and the final price. We therefore
hypothesize that there are no differences in the predictive accuracy.
Hypothesis 3 [Predictive Accuracy]
There are no differences in the predictive accuracy between the mean stated belief, the
mean corrected belief, the equilibrium price, and the final price.
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2.4 Results
2.4.1 Descriptives
In contrast to the first chapter, in which we use the entire set of participants, we only
use the internet participant for the following analysis. Here we focus on the analysis
of prediction markets, and these were only set up in the Internet treatment. Table 2.2
shows the demographics of the Internet participants. This set of participants is used
in Section 2.4.2. A random subset of 1,790 of these participants was allocated to the
matching groups in the prediction market treatment. In the market analysis we only
regard these participants.
Table 2.2: Demographic Characteristics of
Participants
Number of participants 3,582
Avg. response rate 96.8%
Age Avg. (StdDev) 25.6 (5.8)
Sex male 62.5%
Marital Status
Single 90.1%
Married 6.1%
Other 3.8%
Charge of expenses
Self 81.9%
Parents 11.3%
Spouse 1.1%
Other 5.6%
Most frequent countries of origin
Germany 89.9%
China 1.0%
Turkey 0.8%
Russia 0.8%
Poland 0.6%
Other 7.1%
Share of students 79.8%
For students:
Semester Avg. (StdDev) 6.00 (3.75)
Field of Studies
Bus. Adm. 24.5%
Economics 18.8%
Engineering 8.0%
Natural Science 6.9%
Law 6.4%
Other 35.4%
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Table 2.3 displays descriptive summary statistics on the prediction markets. We had 8
matching groups and 16 matches, which gave us 128 markets overall. The average number
of entered traders is 86.2, so for each markets we do not obtain the beliefs from just a
few traders. On average, traders submitted 175.57 offers for both assets, which resulted
in 72.74 average trades on these markets. Although a few of the markets did not attract
much interest of the traders, most markets had a fair level of activity. The figures on
the bundles give us a proxy for the supplies of the assets. One bundle consisted of one
of each assets. Traders could buy and sell bundles from and to the bank. For one given
market, the current number of bundles started at 0 and usually increased with time as
more traders entered and bought bundles. The average number of bundles averages the
current number of bundles over all levels for one market. All figures had a negative time
trend from one match to the next one.
Table 2.3: Summary Statistics for Markets
Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Entered Traders 86.20 8.63 63 106
Submitted Offers 175.57 49.02 77 327
Trades 72.74 22.85 25 131
Avg. No. of Bundles 1,682.50 341.12 846.13 2598.32
2.4.2 Data Imputation
In our prediction market analysis we do not exclude anyone because of an inconsistency in
the HL table or – like in the first chapter – incomplete demographic characteristics. Here
we have to use the entire set of participants. The reason is the same as for the elicitation
of prior instead of posterior beliefs. Markets in which we do not know the utility function
and beliefs of all participants cannot be included in the analysis of the relation of beliefs
and final prices.
To fill up the demographic data of participants who did not submit all of their character-
istics we have to perform item imputation (Rubin (1987)). Specifically, we use “nearest
neighbor hot deck imputation”. The nearest neighbor of an incomplete data point is de-
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termined via Euclidean distance of the items observed for both data points. Afterwards
the missing item is donated from the matched data point to the incomplete data point.
We search through the observations of our own dataset (hot deck) instead of comparing
our data to another dataset (cold deck). Such an imputation mechanism systematically
underestimates variability as it treats the missing items of the data points as if they were
elements of the set of known item values (or convex combinations of these values) and
known with certainty. As an upside, this method does not make any distributional as-
sumptions and is relatively easy to implement. Furthermore, the imputed dataset can be
used just like a non-imputed complete dataset.
The entire set of participants described in Table 2.2 was used in the data imputation.
As participants were randomly allocated to one of the treatments (pari-mutuel or predic-
tion market) we assume the demographics to be distributed similarly. However, we keep
the imputation database as extensive as possible in order to optimize the imputation
procedure.
2.4.3 Risk Aversion and Belief Correction
We estimate the participants’ coefficients of risk aversion like in the first chapter of this
thesis through an interval regression. We neither drop inconsistent participants nor do
we – thanks to the imputation – need to drop participants with incomplete demographic
information. Again, we have two models. The “short model” (SM) includes only sex and
age as demographic variables, while the “extended model” (EM) includes all variables
listed in Table 2.2.
Estimation results from empirical and experimental research like Binswanger (1980),
Hansen and Singleton (1982), Goeree et al. (2003), or Bajari and Hortaçsu (2005) yield
an r in the range of [−0.5, 1.8]. Goeree et al. (2002) provide an extensive overview on
such studies and show that estimation results are mostly in the range of [0.3, 1] for indi-
viduals similar to our pool of participants. This means slight risk aversion for the entire
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population of traders.
Table 2.4: Estimates of r for different models
Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Intreg SM 0.64 0.05 0.32 0.72
Intreg EM 0.64 0.10 0.24 1.06
HL Midpoint 0.52 0.62 -1.71 1.37
MLE SM 0.60 0.01 0.57 0.69
MLE EM 0.61 0.05 0.45 0.78
The interval regression models deliver r estimation data shown in the upper panel of
Table 2.4. The short model estimates the individual r in [0.32, 0.72], while the extended
model estimates r in [0.24, 1.06]. This is in line with our expectation based on previous
studies. The estimated r is positive for each participant in both models – we only have
risk averse participants in our dataset. No participant has an r = 1, so we do not have
any participant with log utility. Apart from extreme values, we have to correct all beliefs
of the participants. Only one single participant has an r > 1 and is therefore very risk
averse by our definition in Section 2.2.4. His beliefs are marginally biased towards 0.5
as his risk aversion coefficient is only marginally greater than 1. Therefore, the graph
of the “probability translation function” of most participants should look similar to the
bright green graph (SRA) in Figure 2.1. We expect our participants to state beliefs biased
towards the extremes in all cases but one.
As robustness checks for the prediction market analysis, we used three other approaches
to estimate the participants’ risk aversion. One very coarse but simple measurement of
risk aversion in which participants were simply assigned an r which was the average of
their minimal r and their maximal r determined by their lottery decisions in the HL table.
Participants for which we had only one of these figures were assigned this figure. Partici-
pants for which we had neither the minimum nor the maximum were assigned an r of 0.
This was the case for 32 participants. The two other approaches were maximum likelihood
estimations (MLE) with Fechner errors and with the SM or the EM of demographics. For
these estimations we use the approach of Harrison (2008) and the corresponding Stata
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code.16 Neither MLE model resulted in an estimated r = 0 for any participant. Results
can be found in the lower panel of Table 2.4.
As one can see, all estimations have a very similar mean r. Only the HL midpoint
estimation technique delivers a slightly lower mean r. The estimated distributions differ
mostly in their standard deviations and their extreme values. Again, the HL midpoint
estimation delivers different data. In these two dimensions it is strongly different from the
others. The similarity of the mean r of the five different estimation techniques combined
with the support of the literature is reassuring as it suggests we analyze our data correctly.
The different standard deviations and extreme values are as one would expect them.
Figure 2.2 shows scatter plots of stated probabilities vs. corrected probabilities for differ-
ent correction models. The axes are organized equivalently to Figure 2.1. On the y-axis
the stated probability of the participant is denoted. On the x-axis the corrected probabil-
ity is denoted. We do not call it “subjective probability”, as we do not know whether this
is actually the subjective probability of the respective participants. It is the subjective
probability of a participant, assuming our estimation of risk aversion and our model of
belief correction is correct. This figure displays all elicited beliefs of all participants of all
matches and all matching groups for six different belief correction models, which gives us
11,034 points (“Market Entries”) in each scatter plot.
The graphs of Figure 2.1 serve as references in analyzing Figure 2.2. Classifications of a
participant’s risk aversion can be made accordingly. A point on the identity line means
that the respective belief was not corrected. A point above the identity line means that the
stated probability is biased towards 1 and was corrected downwards. A point below the
identity line presents a stated probability biased towards 0 which was corrected upwards.
All points are displayed in the same size and at the exact location the data determines
them (i.e. no “jitter” function for the graphs). This means that from the graphs we can
unambiguously derive the underlying probability combination data but not the frequency
of the probability combinations. 100 points on the same coordinates would look identical
16We kindly thank Glenn Harrison for making the code publicly available.
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to one point on the respective coordinates. This lets us easier identify the shape of the
function that translates stated probabilities into corrected probabilities.
Figure 2.2: Stated Probability vs. Corrected Probability for Different Models of Risk
Aversion Estimation
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Stated vs. Corrected Probability Identity Line
The upper left plot – “Log Utility Model” – plots the corrected probability against the
stated probability if we assume log utility for all participants. All points are on the identity
line. The lower left plot – “HL Midpoint Model” – displays the data assuming participants
had levels of risk aversion determined by the HL Midpoint Model. We can identify the
function shapes of very risk averse participants, slightly risk averse participants, slightly
risk loving participants, and very risk loving participants. We also see many data points
at 0.5 of the x-axis. These are data points derived from the risk neutral participants.
Even with our assumptions made for Function 2.6 there is no clear guideline of how to
correct stated beliefs q /∈ {0, 0.5, 1}. We therefore corrected such beliefs for the 32 risk
neutral participants to 0.5. Overall, there is no consistent pattern in this plot.
The two scatter plots in the middle of the upper and the lower panel denote the correction
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results if we assume the risk aversion parameters estimated by the two MLE models. As
expected from the results of Table 2.4 the dots together mimic the function of a slightly
risk averse participant. The dots of the extended model are somewhat more dispersed
than the dots of the short model but they show the same overall pattern. This pattern is
also observable in the plots for both interval regression models. Compared to the extended
MLE model there is more dispersion for the short model of interval regression and even
more dispersion in the extended interval regression model. All these patterns are in line
with the summary statistics of the r estimations.
2.4.4 Comparison of Mean Beliefs, Equilibrium Prices, and Fi-
nal Market Prices
The first statistic we compute is the mean of beliefs for each market and each matching
group. When computing this statistic we average over the beliefs of all entered partici-
pants. We do not weight or exclude the beliefs of single participants in any way. Apart
from Ottaviani and Sørensen (2012) who weight the beliefs in a way that does not apply
in our context, the current theoretical literature does not weight the traders’ beliefs when
the mean belief is computed. There is also no distinction between active and inactive
individuals. All individuals trade. In our markets, entered participants who did not trade
or submit bids/asks could have done this as a response to the current prices and the
bid/ask queues or because of no interest in trading at all. An analysis of participants’
characteristics, beliefs and trading behavior could guide the criterion to discriminate be-
tween these participants. However, such a criterion would always have arbitrary elements.
We therefore assume that beliefs are uncorrelated to the decision of active participation.
This way, we use all submitted unweighted beliefs to determine the mean belief. We do
this for the corrected as well as for the stated beliefs.
Our calculation of the theoretical equilibrium prices closely follows Wolfers and Zitze-
witz (2007). Based on the estimation of the risk aversion parameters, we can derive the
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individual demand functions. These in turn lead to the aggregated demand functions.
Through the complementarity of the two securities, demand of asset 1 determines supply
of asset 2. The price at which aggregated demand is equal to aggregated supply is the
equilibrium price. Such a way of computing the equilibrium price demonstrates the reason
of the shift of the main research interest away from the marginal trader. All traders are
marginal in this setting. There is no specific marginal trader any more.
Regular prediction markets do not yield a defined final price. There are bids and asks
in the respective queues. And there is a last price at which a trade was executed before
the market closed. Both information sources can be used to compute the final price.
Determining this price via the spread of the highest bid and lowest ask at the end of a
market makes the existence of informative bids and asks necessary. Especially at the end
of a thin market when (most) traders have already satisfied their trading demand, this can
be difficult to fulfill. If bids and asks are not just marginally outside of the participants’
trade causing interval, they are arbitrary. So as long as we do not know, whether their
spread is marginally greater than the interval that leads to trade, we can not compute a
meaningful price inside of the spread. Hence, we focus on the prices of executed trades.
We compute the final prices for each asset as a volume-weighted mean of the last ten per-
cent of trades in each market. This procedure makes higher volume trades more important.
We assume that these trades are less likely to be outliers or mistakes. Additionally, the
final price is not tied to a certain time window before the end of the period of potential
trade but focuses on the end of the active trading period. Furthermore, we assume that
prices of later trades are more meaningful than prices of earlier trades, because more
trades have included information in the prices. This procedure can lead to final prices of
the two assets that do not sum up to 1. We correct for this by normalizing the final prices
of the two assets for each market. The price of one asset is divided by the sum of both
prices. Final prices of prediction markets are usually computed in such a way. Examples
of not using the very last price of a market, averaging, or normalizing include Forsythe
et al. (1992), Forsythe et al. (1999), and Berg et al. (2008).
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This gives us four predictive statistics for each market: Mean Stated Belief (MSB),
Mean Corrected Belief (MCB), Equilibrium Price (EP), and Final Price (FP).17 All these
statistics can be used to issue a forecast on the respective future event. Based on the
theoretical literature, especially MCB and EP should be very similar. In a first step, we
compare MSB, MCB, and EP. Theoretical analyses focus on the comparison of mean true
beliefs versus EP. Our corrected belief in the five different models works as a proxy for the
true belief. So the MCB is our proxy for the mean true belief. The MSB is included as
a robustness check. We do this in order to check the results established in the literature.
In the second step, we compare MCB, EP, and FP. Of main interest is the comparison
to FP. The underlying question is whether the EP is actually the right statistic for the
FP. If we found significant and substantial differences of EP and FP this would pose the
question of using the EP in the prediction market analysis at all.
Graphical Analysis
Figure 2.3 shows a scatter plot of the two predictive statistics MCB and EP versus the
MSB. Note, that the axes of these graphs are differently structured than the ones in the
figures above so we cannot compare Figure 2.3 to these figures. However, the graphs follow
the presentation of the results of different models of Figure 2.2. Due to the elicitation
method of the beliefs, the belief correction method, and the normalization of the final
prices, the beliefs and prices of Asset 1 and Asset 2 always sum up to 1. Therefore,
all plots only display the respective statistics for asset 1 (“Team of record wins”). As
in most cases the participants rated the team of record as the better team, most of the
probabilities are greater than 0.5.18 Keep in mind that rank order findings for MSB,
MCB, EP, and FP greater 0.5 for a certain asset are flipped for the complementary asset.
17Keep in mind that in our context the term “probability” of the probability correction literature has
the same meaning as the term “belief” of the prediction market literature.
18This was in line with the official FIFA Ranking at
http://www.fifa.com/worldranking/rankingtable/index.html
This ranking does not get updated during a world cup, only just before and just after it and every few
weeks throughout the year. The better team according to the FIFA ranking usually won the match.
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Figure 2.3: Predictive Statistics vs. Mean Stated Belief for Different Models of Risk
Aversion Estimation
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Each data point represents one predictive statistic of each match and each matching group.
The x-axis denotes the mean stated belief. The y-axis denotes the respective predictive
statistic – the mean (corrected) belief (blue circles) or the equilibrium price (green dots).
A dot on the identity line means that the respective statistic is equal to the mean belief.
A dot above/below the identity line means that the respective statistic is greater/less
than the mean stated belief.
Again, the blue dots of the upper left plot – “Log Utility Model” – show mean corrected
beliefs vs. mean stated beliefs if we assume log utility for all traders. As shown in
Section 2.2.4, this results inMSB =MCB. Supporting this notion, all MCB data points
are on the identity line. Gjerstad (2005), Wolfers and Zitzewitz (2007), and Ottaviani
and Sørensen (2012) state that with such a utility function MCB = EP . Our results are
accordingly, so the green dots are displayed inside of the blue circles. The plot of the “HL
Midpoint Model” shows that the data points of the MCB in most cases deviate from the
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MSB. They are usually lower than the MSB for mean stated beliefs greater than 0.5 and
higher for mean stated beliefs less than 0.5. The data points of the EP also show these
characteristics. They additionally deviate from the MCB and are stronger pulled towards
0.5 than the MCB. This is stronger the greater the distance to an MSB of 0.5.
The plots of the four other models are strikingly similar. These plots are not four times
the same plot and there actually are differences, but they are hard to find. All plots
share the qualitative characteristics of the HL Midpoint Model plot. Usually, the MSB is
greater or equal than the MCB which is greater or equal than the EP for an MSB greater
than 0.5. This relation is flipped for an MSB less than 0.5. Usually, the MSB is less or
equal than the MCB which is less or equal than the EP. Again, both differences seem to
grow if we move away from an MSB of 0.5.
Summarizing the graphical analysis we can say that MSB, MCB, and EP coincide for
log utility. For the other models, the graphical analysis suggests MSB ≥ MCB ≥ EP
for MSB > 0.5 and MSB ≤ MCB ≤ EP for MSB < 0.5. By definition of our
correction method we have the following properties: MCB > 0.5 ⇐⇒ MSB > 0.5,
MCB = 0.5 ⇐⇒ MSB = 0.5, and MCB < 0.5 ⇐⇒ MSB < 0.5. So we can
state another suggestion from the graphical analysis: MCB ≥ EP for MCB > 0.5 and
MCB ≤ EP forMCB < 0.5. Which certain model the researcher employs for estimating
the degree of risk aversion, seems to be of minor importance as long as the estimated r is in
a realistic range. But then again, four of our models yield similar results for the estimated
r. The only model in which MSB, MCB, and EP seem to be notably different is one in
which we deliberately chose a very coarse measurement of the risk aversion parameter.
We expected the MCB to be closer to 0.5 than the MSB, because we saw that in Sec-
tion 2.4.3 that most belief corrections in our dataset are towards 0.5 (because of the risk
aversion of the participants). We had no hypothesis for the relation of the EP towards
the MSB and the MCB apart that by definition of the correction it should be the same.
Figure 2.4 displays the predictive statistics – EP (green) and FP (yellow) – versus the
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MCB for each of the six models. Note, that denoted on the x-axes is now the MCB
as we do not need the MSB for discussion any more. This not only means that we
cannot compare the plots to the ones in Figure 2.3, but also that we cannot compare the
individual plots to each other. Each one has the MCB of the respective model denoted
on its x-axis. Thanks to the information from the graphical analysis of Figure 2.3, we
know that the x-values of the four MLE and interval regression models are roughly the
same. A data point near the identity line denotes a similarity to the respective MCB. We
therefore expect all green dots to be close to the identity line.
Figure 2.4: Predictive Statistics vs. Mean Corrected Belief for Different Models of Risk
Aversion Estimation
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For each plot, two properties are evident at a glance. Firstly, most of the data points for
the FP are nowhere near the data points for the EP. Secondly, most of the data points
for the FP are nowhere near the identity line. It seems like the EP is not a very good
predictor for the FP. At further analysis for all models apart from the Log Utility Model,
we can see that most of the EP data points are below the identity line for an MCB > 0.5
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while most of the FP data points are above the identity line for an MCB < 0.5. The
relations of FP, EP, and identity line to each other are not very clear for an MCB close
to 0.5. The EP dots seem to be above the identity line, but there is no clear pattern for
the FP. As expected, the green dots are very close to the identity line. This again shows
how similar MCB and EP are for the MLE and interval regression models.
We checked the results for several different computations of the FP. We varied the percent-
age of the last trades in the interval [0.001, 1] and computed the prices with and without
volume weighting. Our results are robust to these checks. This is suggestive evidence for
two things. Firstly, prices do not seem to be very volatile. And secondly, outlier price
trades seem to have been traded at a similar volume as non-outlier price trades – if there
are any outlier price trades.
Statistical Tests
From here on, we focus on the extended interval regression model. We do not regard the
Log Utility Model any more and deliver results for the four other models only if they
differ qualitatively or are necessary for comprehension.
In our first tests we compare the statistics presented in Figure 2.3 – MSB, MCB, and EP
– against each other. In a conservative approach, we generate the averages for each of
the three statistics over all 16 matches. This gives us one independent observation per
matching group, 8 overall. A Friedman Test compares the average MSB, average MCB,
average EP against each other. The test rejects the null hypothesis that all the statistics
are identical (Friedman test statistic: 16.0, p-value = 0.0003). The p-value is further
reduced, if we do not average over the matches and use 128 observations for each statistic
(Friedman test statistic: 109.23, p-value < 0.0001).
As a next step we make pairwise comparisons via the Wilcoxon-signed-rank test. The
conservative approach with eight independent observations per statistic lets us reject the
null hypothesis of equal average MSB and average MCB (z = 2.521, p-value = 0.0117).
The comparisons of average MCB vs. average EP and average MSB vs. average EP yields
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the same results with the identical test statistics. Checking the actual numbers shows that
averageMSB > averageMCB > averageEP in each matching group. Keep in mind
that this ordering is entirely driven by the fact that most of our MSB are greater than
0.5. These relations would be flipped if we looked at the statistics for the complementary
event.
We conclude that the belief correction seems to make a difference as well as the calculation
of the EP. However, the quantitative differences are marginal, even if we normalize the
differences by the EP. The absolute difference of EP and MCB, normalized by the EP has a
mean of 0.0261, a standard deviation of 0.0138 and lies in the interval [0.0004, 0.0522]. So
although this difference is statistically significant, it is indeed negligible. But the approach
of the EP has two steps. So of interest are also absolute and normalized difference between
the MSB and the EP. If there were no large differences either, we would not need the
belief correction and the EP calculation. This difference has a mean of 0.0740, a standard
deviation of 0.0363 and lies in the interval [0.0005, 0.1263].19 So this difference is indeed
economically significant and we should not use the MSB instead of the EP. Figure 2.3
supports this finding.
Result 1 [MSB vs. MCB vs. EP]
MSB, MCB, and EP are significantly but not substantially different to each other. For
an MSB greater than 0.5, we usually have MSB > MCB > EP . This is flipped for an
MSB less than 0.5.
Our results confirm the established literature. For reasonable degrees of risk aversion
and realistic distributions of beliefs20, the equilibrium price is usually very close to the
mean belief (MCB in our case). But the most important question is: In what way is
the equilibrium price a substitute for the final price on prediction markets? We answer
19The respective figures for the midpoint model are as follows. Absolute normalized difference of the
MCB to EP: Mean: 0.1066, Std. Dev. : 0.0502, Range: [0.0048, 0.201]. Absolute normalized difference
of the MSB to EP: Mean: 0.2137, Std. Dev. : 0.1102, Range: [0.0046, 0.407].
20By definition, our belief distributions are realistic.
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this question by comparing the final prices on our prediction markets to the respective
equilibrium prices. The graphical analysis suggests that there is a substantial difference
between these two statistics and that the final prices are closer to the extremes than the
equilibrium prices in most cases.
Again, we start conservatively and average EP and FP over all matches. For each matching
group the average EP is greater than the average FP. The result of the Wilcoxon-signed-
rank test (z = -2.521, p-value = 0.0117) lets us again reject the null hypothesis of equal
values. If we do not average but use each single of the 128 observations per statistic, we
again reject the null hypothesis and receive test statistics of z = -7.689, p-value < 0.0001.
We take a look at the actual numbers in order to determine the economic significance. The
absolute difference of the FP and the EP, normalized by the EP has a mean of 0.1983, a
standard deviation of 0.1051 and lies in the interval [0.0011, 0.4383].21 So we can conclude
that the EP is substantially different to the FP. This is a crucial finding. It questions the
fundament of using the EP. Additionally, we see that each step from MSB towards MCB
and towards EP usually increases the difference to the FP.
Result 2 [MCB vs. EP vs. FP]
EP and FP are significantly and substantially different. For an MCB greater than 0.5,
the EP is usually less than the MCB, while the FP is greater than the MCB. This finding
is also flipped for an MCB less than 0.5.
As a robustness check for low participation markets, we run the tests for mean
stated/corrected beliefs also for median stated/corrected beliefs for all models but the
Log Utility Model. We receive the same qualitative results with one exception – the equi-
librium price is usually slightly greater than the median corrected belief for the MLE and
interval regression models. Additionally, we run the entire set of tests without the matches
of Germany. Germans were by far the greatest group of participants and therefore their
21The respective figures of the Midpoint Model are: Mean: 0.3465, Std. Dev.: 0.1698, Range:
[0.0040, 0.7559].
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support for the German team could have biased the results in either direction. Emotional
hedging as well as an optimism bias was possible. Excluding the Germany matches from
the tests does not alter the qualitative results in any way.
2.4.5 Predictive Accuracy
Measuring the predictive accuracy of a forecast for one event is usually done via the
squared prediction error. It is constructed similarly to quadratic scoring rules. The
forecasted (binary) event is allocated 1 if it occurred and 0 if not. The difference between
the eventual outcome and the forecast is squared and the result is the squared prediction
error. When we have more than one forecasted event from a forecaster, we can employ
the measurement introduced by Brier (1950). It is now called the “Brier Score” (BS) and
essentially the mean of the squared prediction error over all possible states and all events
on which forecasts were issued.
Formally, the BS is calculated in the following way: psn denotes the probability
the forecaster assigned to the outcome s  {1, 2, . . . , S} of event (match in our case)
n  {1, 2, . . . , N}. 1A(condition) is again the indicator function.
BS = 1
N
N∑
n=1
S∑
s=1
(psn − 1A(sn))2 ∈ [0, 2]
The BS has a negative orientation, so the forecaster tries to minimize it. It is minimized
if the forecaster assigns 1 to the eventual outcome of each event. It is maximized if the
forecaster assigns 0 to the eventual outcome and 1 to any other outcome for each event.
For binary forecasts with S = 2, a simplified version of the BS exists:
BS = 1
N
N∑
n=1
(pn − 1A(n))2 ∈ [0, 1] (2.7)
The respective forecast pn must always be the forecast for the same outcome s = 1 or
s = 2 for all N events. In a setting with S = 2, the simplified BS is a proper scoring
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rule, as in such a case p2 is fully determined by p1 and vice versa. For S > 2 it is not. In
our setting S = 2, so we use the simplified version. The simplified BS also has a negative
orientation, is minimized if the forecaster assigns 1 to the eventual outcome for all n, and
maximized if the forecaster assigns 0 to the eventual outcome for all n.
In our context, one forecaster is one of the eight matching groups. Table 2.5 summarizes
the BS computed for these matching groups. It lists the BS for all four predictive statistics
for the set of all 16 matches.
Table 2.5: Brier Scores of the 8 Matching Groups for Different
Predictive Statistics and the set of all 16 Matches
Matching Group BS of FP BS of EP BS of MCB BS of MSB
1 0.2030 0.2082 0.2057 0.2052
2 0.2132 0.2052 0.2029 0.1998
3 0.2056 0.2059 0.2030 0.2008
4 0.2067 0.2018 0.1986 0.1933
5 0.2046 0.2100 0.2095 0.2078
6 0.2310 0.2089 0.2084 0.2067
7 0.2193 0.2033 0.1986 0.1939
8 0.2086 0.2032 0.2017 0.2004
A Friedman test gives us the result of significant differences across all four measurements
(Friedman test statistic = 13.35, p-value = 0.0039). When we compare the Brier Scores
pairwise with a Wilcoxon-Signed-Rank Test, we cannot reject the null hypothesis of no
differences between FP and EP (z = 1.4, p-value = 0.1614). However, we find a marginally
significant difference between the FP and the MCB (z = 1.82, p-value = 0.0687), and a
clearly significant difference between FP and MSB (z = 2.1, p-value = 0.0357).
From here on, BS(statistic) denotes the BS of the respective statistic. Again, a Wilcoxon-
Signed-Rank test detects a difference between the BS(EP) and BS(MCB) (z = 2.521,
p-value = 0.0117), as well as between the BS(EP) and BS(MSB) (z = 2.521, p-value =
0.0117). Finally the exact same result is derived for a test between the BS(MCB) and
BS(MSB) (z = 2.521, p-value = 0.0117). The last three results can be explained by the
fact that BS(EP ) > BS(MCB) > BS(MSB) for each matching group.
If we narrow our focus on the twelve matches without Germany, the picture slightly
changes. Table 2.6 shows the respective BS. For each matching group, the BS(FP) is
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greater than all other statistics. The picture is less clear for the other three statistics.
Table 2.6: Brier Scores of the 8 Matching Groups for Different
Predictive Statistics and the subset of 12 Matches without
Germany
Matching Group BS of FP BS of EP BS of MCB BS of MSB
1 0.2115 0.2103 0.2083 0.2090
2 0.2233 0.2086 0.2080 0.2052
3 0.2120 0.2066 0.2048 0.2041
4 0.2198 0.2036 0.2002 0.1959
5 0.2312 0.2145 0.2150 0.2141
6 0.2464 0.2127 0.2138 0.2120
7 0.2369 0.2031 0.1994 0.1952
8 0.2197 0.2087 0.2074 0.2080
The usual Friedman test is significant and shows us the differences of the four sets of BS
(Friedman test statistic = 19.8, p-value = 0.0002). Pairwise comparisons with a Wilcoxon-
Signed-Ranks test shows significant differences of the BS(FP) to any other BS with the
identical test statistics (z = 2.521, p-value = 0.0117).
The same test rejects the null hypothesis for the comparison of BS(EP) and BS(MCB)
(z = 1.96, p-value = 0.0499) as well as for the comparison of BS(EP) and BS(MSB) (z
= 2.521, p-value = 0.0117). Finally, we reject the null hypothesis for the comparison of
BS(MCB) and BS(MSB) (z = 1.96, p-value = 0.0499).
So the test results between BS(EP), BS(MCB), and BS(MSB) are identical for both sets
of matches. However, while there are no significant differences between BS(FP) and
BS(EP) in all 16 matches, the BS(FP) gets relatively worse for the subset of matches
without Germany and statistically different from BS(EP). Generally, the predictive accu-
racy of the four predictive statistics are ordered in the following: BS(FP ) ≥ BS(EP ) >
BS(MCB) > BS(MSB). Keep in mind that a lower value is preferable to a higher
value. So to derive good predictions in events similar to ours, one does not need predic-
tion markets. The simplest belief elicitation method and the stated beliefs deliver the best
forecasts (if it attracts the same set of participants). But the differences in the predictive
accuracy are only marginal. The final prices are usually more extreme than the other
predictions. Hence the accuracy result is most likely to be caused by a strong impact
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of high squared prediction errors when the prediction is wrong. As the squaring of a
prediction error weights the prediction errors by themselves, the penalty for an extreme
and wrong prediction is stronger than the one for a mediocre and wrong prediction.
Result 3 [Predictive Accuracy]
The simplest predictive statistic – the mean stated belief – outperforms all other statistics
in predictive accuracy. The final price has the worst predictive accuracy. The equilibrium
price and the mean corrected belief rank in between the other statistics. Overall the
absolute differences are only marginal.
2.5 Conclusions
We analyzed prediction markets in the context of the FIFA Soccer World Cup 2006 and
wanted to know in what way these markets are actually influenced by the utility functions
and the beliefs of their traders. The established theoretical literature focuses on these two
input factors and derives two predictive statistics, the mean of beliefs and the equilibrium
price. Both are regarded as very similar and the equilibrium price serves as a substitute
for the final price. If this was the case, prediction markets were nothing more but an
instrument to elicit traders’ beliefs. Any incentive compatible belief elicitation approach
which gathered the same set of participants would be equivalent, and preferable if cheaper.
However, not a single paper so far tested, whether the equilibrium price is actually a
good proxy for the final price. The final price is the statistic which is used to generate
the prediction market’s forecast. A substantial difference between these statistics would
challenge the prevalence of the equilibrium price as a substitute for the final price. The
equilibrium price could still be the best proxy we have for the final price, but the dif-
ference of these statistics could be so big that it would render the equilibrium price an
unreasonable instrument.
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Summing up our results, it seems like the established literature was right and wrong.
Although statistically significant, we only find negligible differences between the mean
belief and the equilibrium price. This confirms the established results. But the litera-
ture was misguided when using the equilibrium price. In our data it is significantly and
substantially different from the final price. Actually, the mean belief and even the mean
uncorrected belief are usually closer to the final price than the equilibrium price. We do
not find qualitative differences in these results across all realistic utility function models.
This supports the general notion of only marginal impacts through utility functions as
long as they are realistically estimated. Another finding of our data is that we do not
see qualitative differences between the model results if we employ differently estimated
degrees of risk aversion. The literature says, as long as the distribution of the risk aversion
coefficient is empirically valid, we will receive similar results for different degrees of risk
aversion. We do not find evidence against that.
Obviously, prediction markets do more than just eliciting beliefs and weighting them
to achieve the equilibrium price. Not only risk aversion and beliefs make them tick.
Dynamic factors seem to play another role. At least three explanations of our results
are possible. The first one is that these markets gather information during the trading
period which is by construction not reflected in our elicited beliefs. This would mean
that the submitted beliefs during the runtime should change. In a quick analysis, we do
not find this. Additionally, during the runtime of all markets, there was no release of
information so severe that it would explain the magnitude in the difference of equilibrium
price and final price. The second explanation would be that prediction markets weigh the
participants’ beliefs in a way that we do not fully understand yet. Tentative support for
this hypothesis (and against the first one) gives the relation of the mean corrected belief
and the final price towards 0.5. In only eleven out of 128 occasions, the mean corrected
belief was greater than 0.5 while the final price was less, or vice versa. And in all these
occasions, the mean corrected belief was very close to 0.5 – in the range [0.46, 0.53]. So
there was generally a high degree of uncertainty in the respective prediction market. The
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third explanation is simply that we did not elicit the true beliefs and utility functions of
the participants. But this would mean that state-of-the-art methods of economic research
do not result in the correct data and that our results can still be taken as the most realistic
approach so far.
Concerning the accuracy of our predictive statistics, we find significant differences of them.
The best predictor is the mean stated belief, followed by the mean corrected belief and
the equilibrium price. The final price surprisingly ranks worst in our analysis of predictive
accuracy. In the best setting for its performance, it is just as good as the equilibrium
price. Note that the absolute differences in predictive accuracy for all four statistics are
only minor. Additionally, it may still be useful to set up a prediction market to gather
forecasts as this platform gathers the “right” participants.
We stress that our results have one noteworthy caveat. We elicit prior, not posterior
beliefs. We therefore cannot reject any of the models presented in the literature. We do,
however, offer the most extensive and realistic dataset so far. Future research should focus
on dynamic aspects of final price determination and a weighted mean belief. The most
prominent theoretical example of such an approach is Ottaviani and Sørensen (2012).
Furthermore, the predictive accuracy should be more extensively analyzed.
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2.6 Appendix
2.6.1 Screenshots
Figure 2.5: Screenshot of the General Rules Page
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Figure 2.6: Screenshot of the Belief Submission Page
90
What Makes them Tick
Figure 2.7: Screenshot of the Market Rules Page 1/3
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Figure 2.8: Screenshot of the Market Rules Page 2/3
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Figure 2.9: Screenshot of the Market Rules Page 3/3
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Figure 2.10: Screenshot of a Market
Notes: This screenshot shows an actual market. As an example we picked the match Germany vs.
Sweden in the round of the last 16 teams. On the very top, trader participant found browsing links. Just
below this area, general information on the respective market and the participant’s financial situation
are given. In the center of the page, the participant found rows of information on each of the “shares”.
The participant’s holding of the respective share is shown, queued bids and asks as well as the last price
to which a share was traded. In the lower part of the screen, the participant’s current offers as well as
his trading history were displayed.
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Figure 2.11: Screenshot of the Offer Submission Page
Notes: The participant was guided to this screen if he clicked on “Buy/Sell” in the market overview
page. He could specify the relevant data for the offer. All information on the respective share was still
displayed.
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Figure 2.12: Screenshot of the Bundle Trade Page
Notes: The participant was guided to this screen if he clicked on “Buy/Sell Bundles” in the market
overview page.
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Chapter 3
Social Interaction and Information in
a Relative Payment Scheme0
3.1 Introduction
Relative payment schemes are a useful tool to reward workers. The company knows its
expenditures before the actual payment and is unaffected by positive production shocks.
The worker in turn is unaffected by negative production shocks. But he is paid through
a payment scheme, which is usually met with discomfort. A relative payment scheme is
also susceptible to collusion. If workers find a coordination device, they could collectively
lower their effort without changing their payment level. Although relative payments like
rank-order tournaments have beneficial characteristics in theory (Lazear and Rosen, 1981),
they are hardly used in compensating workers apart from promotion (Lazear, 1989). The
potential for collusion might be a reason for this.1
An exception from the usual abstention from relative wage payments is described in
Bandiera et al. (2005) for fruit pickers in England.2 Our research closely focuses on
0This chapter is based on joint work with Alain Cohn, Ernst Fehr, and Michel Maréchal.
1An extensive overview of compensation schemes is found in Prendergast (1999). Lazear and Shaw
(2007) give a broader discussion on the research agenda in personnel economics. An overview on field
experiments in labor economics is given in List and Rasul (2011).
2The only field study which researches a similar payment scheme and we are aware of is Knoeber and
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this paper. The authors analyze fruit pickers in England and find that a relative pay-
ment scheme in which the piece rate is determined by the performance of the individual
relative to the average performance of the reference group gives lower incentives than an
exogenously determined piece rate. They conclude that this is due to the workers partially
internalizing the negative externality they impose on coworkers. Such internalization only
happens if workers pick certain fruits which allows them to interact socially and to moni-
tor each other. It is unclear whether this result is driven by the information exchange or
the social interaction. Our research tries to shed light on this issue.
We design a natural field experiment (Harrison and List, 2004) in order to find out whether
social interaction or information drove the stated results of Bandiera et al.’s (2005) study.
Our participants worked in dyads and were paid through a relative payment scheme. Their
task was to register library books in a database. We binary vary of social interaction and
the information exchange. Our results support the notion that social interaction reduces
both output level and output difference of the workers. Performance information exchange
in a dyad does not lead to a significant output reduction but to a reduction of the output
difference. This leads to the conclusion, that the effect in Bandiera et al. (2005) was
mainly driven by the social interaction channel.
Experimental examples of research on communication as a coordination device in the
context of incentive schemes include Sutter and Strassmair (2009) who have a tournament
setup in which teams compete against each other. They find that communication within
teams increases team efforts and communication between teams decreases team efforts.
Harbring (2006) finds evidence for cooperation through communication in two different
incentive schemes. Communication increases effort in a team incentives setup, whereas
communication decreases effort in a tournament incentives setup. Our setting differs from
these studies in the way that we want to stress the social interaction channel and therefore
Thurman (1994) for broiler production in the USA. In this paper, a producer’s payment for each pound of
broiler is inversely related to the respective producer’s production costs relative to the average production
costs. They find that the payment difference, not the payment level, drive performance. Furthermore,
they find that handicapped competitors implement riskier strategies than others and that tournament
organizers want to minimize ability differences of the players.
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tie communication to social interaction.
Information as a coordination device can mainly be found in the domain of industrial
organization, namely as a fostering element of tacit collusion. In field data of the credit
card market, Knittel and Stango (2003) find that price ceilings can lead to tacit collusion.
Such price ceilings provide a focal point on which competing firms can coordinate. An
empirical study which shows tacit collusion without a clear focal point is Ellison and Wol-
fram (2006). In a pharmaceutical pricing setting, the companies coordinate on a certain
price increase. Laboratory studies include Cason (1994), who finds that under certain
conditions in a market experiment, players reveal information in order to achieve a higher
joint profit. Cason and Mason (1999) stress the importance of information revelation in
order to achieve tacit collusion in duopoly markets. Bajari and Hortaçsu (2004) summa-
rize the results from research on Internet auctions and also discuss tacit collusion in this
context. To the best of our knowledge, tacit collusion through the information channel
was not yet explicitly analyzed in the setting of a relative payment scheme. We do not
find support for information as a trigger for tacit collusion in such a context.
We also contribute to the literature on office arrangements. This strand of research
mostly deals with the employees’ well-being and job-satisfaction. Marans and Spreck-
elmeyer (1982) provide a summary of comparisons of conventional and open office designs
with respect to work station satisfaction. The allotted space is the driving force in this
context. Zahn (1991) analyze the impact of spatial distance of employees on their face-
to-face communication. Studies on office arrangements and employees’ output are rare,
although these arrangements gain importance with the prevailing reduction of office space
for each employee.3 Our research sheds light on the incentive effects of office arrangements
and information channels, when companies implement a relative payment scheme. Our
supplementary data from a questionnaire on work environments, information exchange,
and payment schemes at the workplace of more than 100 German establishments suggests
3“The average amount of space allotted to each employee shrank from 500 square feet in the 1970s
to 200 square feet in 2010.” (Peter Miscovich, managing director of corporate solutions for Jones Lang
LaSalle in New York.)
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that companies take into account the interaction of these factors.
3.2 Research Design
German libraries usually organized their inventories in a classification type they had
freely chosen. In order to align the organizing system for books nationwide, an increasing
number of libraries follow the “Regensburger Verbundklassifikation” (Regensburg classi-
fication), introduced in 1964. In our experimental setting, participants had to enter the
information for these catalogues for books of a German library. We were provided with a
couple of rooms in which we set up work environments with notebooks. The experiment
was conducted from May 2010 until May 2011.
Recruitment
A few weeks before the experiment, workers were recruited to catalogue the books of the
library. An advertisement was placed on a job search website and posters were hung up
in student dorms. The job advertisement stated that the library was looking for reliable
and independent manpower with a quick grasp of the electronic entry of books. The job
advertisement described a one-time job limited to exactly four hours. No information on
the wage was given. Applicants could show interest in the job via an online application
form. The application form requested contact information and disposability. In addition,
applicants were asked to complete an online typing speed test, which lasted five minutes.
The online test was an exact reproduction of the task on the job and serves as a measure
for workers’ ability. However, applicants were hired on the basis of disposability and not
ability. Hired applicants received a confirmation email reminding them of the terms of
work and indicating the date of their shift. A reminder email was sent out two days ahead
of their shift and a reminder call was made on the evening before their shift. Applicants
with insufficient local language skills were excluded from the applicant pool. All workers
were unaware of participating in an experiment.4
4After the experiment, we asked the participants to sign a permission to use the generated data for
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Work
Workers were welcomed by one or two research assistants who explained the task and
accompanied them to an office.5 The workers tested the input mask under the supervision
of the research assistants. Their task was to record the library books into an electronic
database through an input mask. Seven packing cases were assembled in a line beside
the table the participants worked at. Overall about 500 books were stored in these cases.
There was no clear assignment of participants to certain boxes. For each book they
had to enter its title, author(s), publisher, ISBN number and year of publication. Each
participant received instant feedback about his own performance. A screenshot of the
input mask can be found in the appendix.
Treatments
We invited the workers in groups of four. If workers showed up in an odd number,
they were assigned to a treatment which is left for future research. If only two work-
ers showed up, they were assigned to one of the “Sameroom” treatments explained be-
low. Groups of four were randomly allocated in teams of two and assigned to one of
four treatments.6 These treatments differed in two dimensions. The first one was in-
formation. We either provide both participants of one team with information about the
other participant’s performance in real time, or not (Info/NoInfo). The other dimension
was the room setting. Participants of one team either sat in the same room or in two
different rooms (Sameroom/Mixedroom). If one group was split across two rooms, an-
other group was split up as well and its members were seated in the same two rooms.
This way, we kept the number of participants in one room constant. This provided us
with four treatments: Sameroom/NoInfo (SN), Sameroom/Info (SI), Mixedroom/NoInfo
(MN), Mixedroom/Info (MI). Please note, that workers in the Sameroom/NoInfo treat-
research. Participants who did not sign this permission were paid like all other participants but we do
not include their data in the analysis.
5The research assistants were instructed to strictly follow a plan of procedures which included a
detailed description of the communication with the workers. One research assistant cared for two workers
at most.
6The research assistants made sure that the four workers were of same sex and that siblings and
friends were assigned to the same treatment.
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ment still knew roughly about their teammate’s performance as they sat face to face at
one table. Additionally, all participants were told their performance in the online test in
front of everyone. So the participants had a fair estimation about their ability relative to
their team members.
The payment scheme was identical for all these treatments and was exactly described at
the beginning of the session. We implemented a relative payment scheme. Workers earned
44.00e plus a performance-based element. This element depended on the difference in
logged books among team members: workers received (lost) 0.20e for each book they
logged more (less) than their team member. Input quality was not part of the payment
scheme.7 However, this was never mentioned explicitly in order to keep the workers from
logging in mere nonsense. Workers were provided a handout with a detailed illustration
of this incentive scheme. A translation of this handout can be found in the appendix. A
payment scheme of this kind is usually not implemented in companies, but it covers the
essential features of typical relative payment schemes. It is a zero-sum game and effort is
- ceteris paribus - translated into (expected) higher payment.
Workers were left alone on the job. If they needed help, they could call a research
assistant.8 After four hours of work, the research assistants went back to the offices to
calculate the workers’ pay by counting the entries of the two group members. Thereafter,
workers filled in a short questionnaire, signed a form and were cashed out.
3.3 Theoretical Model
For clear-cut hypotheses, we have to derive a model and make assumptions on the utility
function as well as the cost function of the agents.9 In our model we have 2 agents:
i = 1, 2. They receive relative performance incentives wi = γ + δ(ei − ej), with δ > 0. In
7It would have been prohibitively costly to program a routine that recognized the entered book to
regard quality in a correct way.
8In the meantime, the research assistants recorded whether workers understood the task and incentive
scheme instructions.
9The basic model was developed by Florian Ederer and we kindly thank him for his support.
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our notation, j means “not” i. Their effort has convex costs ci(ei) = ai2 e
2
i , where ai > 0
captures ability. So a lower ai means a higher ability and therefore lower effort costs for
the same effort. In our context, agent i is the one with the higher ability.
It is possible to implement punishment P for the agent deviating from an informal con-
tract: P = 0 without social interaction and without information, P > 0 with social
interaction or with information. This punishment mechanism works through social pun-
ishment. The punishing agent verbally criticizes the deviating agent as soon as the devi-
ation from the informal contract is detected. We assume that punishment is equally high
for both team members. Furthermore, we assume costless punishment like reprehension.
(Cooper and Kühn (2011) show that verbal punishment can have an effect in a laboratory
experiment on collusion.) So the punishment can be implemented, as soon as the workers
interact face-to-face. This can be during the task in the Same Room treatments or after
the task in the Mixed Room treatments. No worker knows about the performance of
the other worker during the task in the Mixed Room, No Information treatment. Hence,
we assume that punishment is lowest in this treatment and set it to 0. We assume risk-
neutrality for both agents: Ui = wi − ci(ei) − P . We also assume the absence of side
payments.
3.3.1 Mixed Room, No Information
The agent solves the following maximization problem:
max
ei
[
γ + δ(ei − ej)− ai2 e
2
i − P
]
The first-order condition yields
e∗,MNi =
δ
ai
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and with P = 0 the agent’s surplus is
Ui = γ +
δ2
2ai
− δ
2
aj
3.3.2 Same Room, (No) Information
With social interaction in one room the agents establish an informal contract which
amounts to
max
ei,ej
[Ui + Uj] = max
ei,ej
[wi + wj − ci(ei)− cj(ej)]
subject to
w∗i − ci(e∗i ) ≥ maxei [wi − c(ei)− P ] for i = 1, 2
Consider the first unconstrained maximization problem which is
max
ei,ej
[
2γ + δ(ei − ej) + δ(ej − ei)− ai2 e
2
i −
aj
2 e
2
j
]
which has a corner solution given by
ei = 0 for i = 1, 2
and each agent earns a surplus given by
Ui = γ
The reneging constraint has to hold which yields
P ≥ δ
2
2ai
for i = 1, 2
Here we can introduce differences in the Information and the No Information version of
the treatments. In the Same Room, Information treatment, both workers are perfectly
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informed about the team member’s performance at any point in time. One member can
implement the punishment P immediately after he realizes the other member’s deviation
from shirking. In the Same Room, No Information treatment he cannot identify such
a deviation as clearly. So it can take time until the social punishment is implemented.
To catch this, we include the discount factor dh ∈ (0, 1) for P in the Same Room, No
Information treatment. The subscript h is for “high”. A following section introduces
another discount factor so that we have to distinguish these factors.
The reneging constraint in the Same Room, No Information Treatment is
dhP ≥ δ
2
2ai
for i = 1, 2
For the Same Room, Information treatment: If P < δ22ai full collusion is no longer possible,
but some degree of collusion is still feasible and the reneging constraint will be binding.
Thus, we have
γ + δ (ei − ej)− ai2 e
2
i ≥ γ +
δ2
2ai
− δej − P
or
δei − ai2 e
2
i ≥
δ2
2ai
− P
Solving the quadratic equation yields
ei =
δ
ai
−
√
2P
ai
Thus, equilibrium effort is given by
e∗,SIi = max
{
0, δ
ai
−
√
2P
ai
}
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Equilibrium effort for the Same Room, No Information treatment is given by
e∗,SNi = max
0, δai −
√
2dhP
ai

3.3.3 Mixed Room, Information
Here, we introduce another discount factor dl ∈ (0, 1). dl < dh because the punishment
can only be implemented after the task. (“l” is for “low”.) Agents establish the same
informal contract like in both Same Room Treatments. The entire analysis is identical
to these treatments, but instead of dh of the Same Room, No Information treatment, we
employ dl.
This yields an equilibrium effort of
ei = max
0, δai −
√
2dlP
ai

3.3.4 Discussion
When comparing effort in the treatments of participants in the four treatments, we have
the following equilibrium efforts:10
eMNi =
δ
ai
eSIi = max
{
0, δ
ai
−
√
2P
ai
}
eSNi = max
0, δai −
√
2dhP
ai

eMIi = max
0, δai −
√
2dlP
ai

10We drop the superscript ∗ from now on
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Given our assumptions, the efforts are ranked as follows: eMNi > eMIi ≥ eSNi ≥ eSIi . We
also note that the equilibrium effort (agent surplus) is decreasing (increasing) in the size
of P .
When agents differ in their ability (i.e. ai 6= aj), the difference in equilibrium effort
decreases with the size of the punishment. For a given punishment P that is lower than
the thresholds for full collusion, consider the difference in effort choices when ai 6= aj. We
have:
eMNi − eMNj =
δ
ai
− δ
aj
eSIi − eSIj =
(
δ
ai
−
√
2P
aj
)
−
(
δ
aj
−
√
2P
aj
)
=
(
δ
ai
− δ
aj
)
−
(√
2P
ai
−
√
2P
aj
)
We derive the differences in the SN and MI treatments accordingly:
eSNi − eSNj =
(
δ
ai
− δ
aj
)
−
√2dhP
ai
−
√√√√2dhP
aj

eMIi − eMIj =
(
δ
ai
− δ
aj
)
−
√2dlP
ai
−
√√√√2dlP
aj

So the effort differences in the four treatments are ordered in the same way the effort
levels are ordered. This ordering is not as clear any more, if P is just as high as necessary
to implement zero effort of j only. We assume that this is never the case. This is also
shown in our data. No participant exerted an effort of 0.
We can also analyze which agent has more to gain from cooperation and collusion when
agents are different. This can be done by looking at the full coordination/collusion reneg-
ing constraint which is given by
P ≥ δ
2
2ai
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Thus with ai < aj the more productive agent i has a higher temptation to renege on the
agreement, or equivalently he has less to gain from cooperation/collusion than the less
productive agent. When an informal agreement is made, the more productive agent will
have to reduce his effort relative to the first best, for example when
δ2
2ai
≥ P ≥ δ
2
2aj
while the other agent j will exert the effort of a setting without informal agreements.
3.4 Hypotheses
Our two treatment dimensions are information and social interaction. We expect that
social interaction reduces the workers’ output and as well as the output difference through
informal contracts. We expect that information yields similar results. Workers set up
similar informal contracts in all treatments apart from MN.
If the two workers of one team sit together in an office, they can interact socially. In
the SI and SN treatments, a team dyad maximizes its overall payoff. This means that
its members lower their output compared to a situation without social interaction and
information as they will get punished, if they do not. They lower their output nonpro-
portionally. Hence the output difference will be reduced as well. As long as the reneging
constraint holds, the informal contract stays in effect.
Spatially separated team members cannot interact socially during the task. Without
information on the team member’s output, this implies that selfish workers maximize their
private surplus. They do not take a social punishment into account. Therefore, workers
enter books until their marginal cost equals their marginal benefit of 0.20e. However,
information on the team member’s performance can suffice to set up an informal contract.
In this case, we expect a reduced output and a reduced output difference in treatment MI
like in treatments SI and SN.
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Summing up and following out theoretical analysis, we expect social interaction and in-
formation to lead to a comparatively lower output as well as a lower output difference.
Differences in effort costs should prevent the output level and the output difference to
achieve zero. Differences in the discount factor of the punishment lead to different mag-
nitudes of the effect in the three treatments with social punishment.
We derive two Hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1 [Output]
We expect the highest effort level in the MN treatment. Participants in the MI treatment
exhibit a lower effort. The effort in the SN treatment should be lower or equal than the
effort in the MI treatment. Finally, the effort in the SI treatment should be lower or equal
than in the SN treatment.
Hypothesis 2 [Output Difference]
The ranking of the effort level differences is completely analogue to the ranking in Hy-
pothesis 1. We expect the highest effort level difference in the MN treatment. Participants
in the MI treatment exhibit a lower effort level difference. The effort level difference in
the SN treatment should be lower or equal than the effort in the MI treatment. Finally,
the effort level difference in the SI treatment should be lower or equal than in the SN
treatment.
3.5 Results
3.5.1 Descriptives
An overview on the descriptives is given in Table 3.1. We had 84 participants, whose age
mostly lay in the twenties but went up to 53 years. Most of our participants were female.
The number of characters in the online test - which we use as a proxy for ability - has an
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Table 3.1: Descriptives
Number of Participants 84
Average Age (Std. Dev.) 25 (6.5)
Sex Female 62 %
Avg. Characters in Online Test (Std. Dev.) 388 (145.38)
average of just below 400 and has a standard deviation of 145.
Figure 3.1 shows the correlation of the ability elicited in the online test (Number of
characters) to the output in the 4 hours work time (number of books). We can see that
the performance in the online test is a fair predictor of output in the work time. We will
therefore use this performance as a proxy for ability of the workers. In this graph we can
also see that the ability of the workers is broadly distributed.
Figure 3.1: Ability Check
Notes: The graph plots the number of books versus the number of characters in the online test for each
individual.
3.5.2 Regressions
We pool the data and employ dummies for the treatments as well as a variable for the
workers’ ability and the ability difference in the output and output difference regression,
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respectively. The omitted category is MN (Mixedroom/NoInfo).
Output
Table 3.2 shows the results of the regression of output. It lists the coefficients for a linear
regression of output (books) on the four treatment dummies with robust standard errors
and clusters for participant groups that worked at the same time. In the second model, the
ability of participants is included. Following our first hypothesis, we expect the coefficient
of the “Info”-dummy (for the information dimension) to be less than 0, the coefficient of
the “Same”-dummy (for the room dimension) to be less or equal than the coefficient of
the “Info”-dummy, and the sum of the coefficients of both dummies and the interaction
effect dummy to be at most as big as the other dummies.
First of all, we do not find a significant effect of the Info-dummy. The Same-dummy is
three times the Info-dummy and significant. The interaction term is not significant. And
neither is the entire model, as its entire p-value is 0.116. When we focus on the model with
ability, the results are sharpened and the entire model is now significant. Ability – the
number of characters in the online test – is positive and highly significant. The coefficient
of the Info-dummy only changed marginally and is still insignificant. The effect of the
same room is increased and is highly significant like in the other model. The interaction
effect of the same room and information is increased, but is still not significant.
When we compare the coefficients of the model with ability, we can partly rank them ac-
cording to our hypothesis. The omitted category (MN) indeed is the one which generates
the highest output. However, the coefficient for the “Info”-dummy is not significantly dif-
ferent from 0, although it is negative. The coefficient for the “Same”-dummy is negative,
significantly different from 0, and a post-estimation test reveals that “Same” is just signif-
icantly different from the “Info”-dummy (F-statistic = 2.86, p-value = 0.0995). Summing
up all dummies yields a mediocre effect, although the “Info”-dummy is not significant. All
dummies together are significantly different from 0 (F-statistic = 3.44, p-value = 0.0719).
However, the information dummy jointly with the interaction dummy are not significantly
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Table 3.2: Regression of Output on
Treatment Dummies and Ability
Coeff. Coeff.
(Rob. SE) (Rob. SE)
Info -6.283 -9.472
(17.921) (15.303)
Same -28.100** -32.836***
(12.543) (8.585)
Same*Info 5.383 13.486
(23.611) (21.002)
Ability 0.137***
(0.038)
Constant 169.950*** 118.957***
(10.670) (16.490)
Obs. 84 84
R2 0.097 0.326
Prob> F 0.116 0.000
Notes: *, **, and *** indicate signif-
icance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level,
respectively. The omitted category is
“Mixedroom/NoInfo”.
different from the “Same”-dummy (F-statistic = 0.08, p-value = 0.7799).
Although it has a negative coefficient, information does not lead to a significantly reduced
output level. So the participants in our experiment could not establish tacit collusion. It
seems like such collusion is hard to establish in a context of employee compensation. In
contrast to that, social interaction significantly decreases the output. So the channel of
social interaction seems to have a clearly higher impact than the channel of information.
Additionally, information has ambiguous effects. While added information in the Mixed
Room treatments has a negative effect on output, it actually has a small positive effect on
output in the Same Room treatments. One reason might be the worker’s focus on their
output relative to the team member’s output which could be perfectly compared with
information. This focus could have introduced a competitive component to the setting,
which is rather focused on social interaction when participants just sit together in the
office.
Result 1 [Output]
Only the SN and the SI treatments lead to a significant reduction of output compared to
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Table 3.3: Regression of Output
Difference on Treatment Dummies
and Ability Difference
Info -15.833* -16.893**
(9.217) (7.668)
Same -19.800*** -18.086***
(6.666) (5.837)
Same*Info 29.033* 27.110**
(15.100) (11.045)
|∆ Ability| 0.135***
(0.028)
Constant 31.500*** 11.406**
(4.636) (4.972)
Obs. 42 42
R2 0.095 0.496
Prob> F 0.039 0.000
Notes: *, **, and *** indicate signif-
icance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level,
respectively. The omitted category is
“Mixedroom/NoInfo”.
the MN treatment. The reductions in these treatments are not significantly different from
each other.
Output Difference
Table 3.3 shows the results of the output difference regression. It regresses output differ-
ence on the treatment dummies in the first model and includes the difference of ability
in the second model. We focus on the model without the ability difference of two group
members. As we only have 42 observations, we want to minimize the number of explana-
tory variables. The entire model is significant and so is every coefficient. Compared to
the omitted category, information as well as same room reduces output difference. But
the coefficients are not significantly different from each other (F-statistic = 0.18, p-value
= 0.6726). Additionally, all three dummies together are not significantly different from 0
(F-statistic = 0.18, p-value = 0.6726). Additionally, neither the step from the MI treat-
ment (“Information”-dummy) nor the step from the SN treatment (“Same”-dummy) to
the SI treatment (all dummies) is significantly different from 0 (F-statistic = 0.46, p-value
= 0.5008 and F-statistic = 1.22, p-value = 0.2786, respectively).
113
Social Interaction
Sitting together in one room or receiving the output information of the team member
has an output difference reducing effect of the same magnitude compared to the baseline
(MN). In contrast to that, sitting in one room and receiving output information does not
reduce output. The reason might again be a reintroduced focus on competition. Due to
the low number of observations, we should interpret the results cautiously.
Result 2 [Output Difference]
The SN and the MI treatments lead to a significant reduction of output difference com-
pared to the MN treatment. But the respective coefficients are not significantly different
from each other. The SI treatment does not reduce output difference.
3.5.3 IAB-Data
Our theoretical analysis and the data suggest that it is suboptimal for the employer to
have a relative payment scheme when there is a high degree of social interaction, a fair
exchange of productivity information, or both. Were companies implicitly or explicitly
knowing this result, we expected relative payments schemes only in work environments
with little social interaction and sparse output information among coworkers.
The “Institut für Arbeits- und Berufsforschung”11 (IAB) in Nuremberg (Germany) main-
tains the “IAB Betriebspanel”12. In this representative panel, about 16,000 establishments
in Germany are personally interviewed annually. It includes data points like industry sec-
tor, production data, finance data, personnel data, etc. A pilot is conducted half a year
in advance of the actual personal interviews which themselves are conducted from June
to October of the respective year. In the pilot for the 2012 panel, questions about rela-
tive rewards and social interaction were included. Our data is taken from this pilot. A
translation of the questionnaire can be found in the appendix.
11“Institute for Employment Research”
12“IAB Establishment Panel” More information can be found on
http://www.iab.de/en/erhebungen/iab-betriebspanel.aspx/
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We could not include our questions in the actual panel and the sample of the pilot is not a
random subsample of the panel. So any reasoning based on results of this sample can only
be suggestive, not conclusive. We therefore restrain ourselves to a very simple statistical
analysis. Statistical tests are based on all valid and non-missing data. However, due to
confidentiality reasons, the data may not be presented in tables.
3.5.4 Questionnaire Design
We measured relative incentives through two questions concerning the relative payment
and the promotion based on relative performance. For both questions we asked for the
existence of such schemes and for the share of employees.
To measure information, we asked whether employees get explicitly informed about the
performance of employees with similar tasks. In two further questions, we asked for
general social interaction among employees and about the frequency of team events like
skiing events or bowling events. Another question dealt with the office composition and
therefore asked for both social interaction and in a very broad way.
Descriptives
115 establishments returned valid data for the pilot of the 2012 panel. Their number of
employees ranges from 1 to 5,200 with a mean of 376 and a standard deviation of 745.82.
Covered industries include trade, construction, services, and production goods. More
than half of the establishments are in the sectors of investment/durable goods, trade and
the service sector.
Results
As a first step, we build a crosstab of the establishments with(out) relative payment versus
the number of establishments with(out) information of workers on the output of others.
115
Social Interaction
A marginally significant Chi-squared test supports the impression that information and
relative payment seem to be positively related (Pearson Chi2(1) = 2.7259, p = 0.099).
We organize the data of the establishments with(out) relative payment versus the degree
of social interaction and we conduct a Chi-squared test. It fails to be significant (Pearson
chi2(4) = 7.3996, p = 0.116). But we can find a spearman’s rho of -0.1812 at a significance
level of 0.0727. So there seems to be a slight negative correlation between the intensity of
social interaction and the number of establishments with relative payment. We do not find
similar results for the frequency of social interaction and the number of establishments
with relative promotion.
However, the results get sharpened if we build a binary index of relative payment and
relative promotion. The binary index is set to 1 if either relative payment or relative pro-
motion are implemented in an establishment and 0 otherwise. Such an index makes sense
as it eliminates potential ambiguity from special contracts which deal with promotion and
relative payment in a special way. Important for our analysis is the general existence of
relative rewards in a broad sense. A Chi-squared test (Pearson chi2(4) = 9.8246, p =
0.043) and a spearman rank correlation rho of -0.2302 (p = 0.0219) support the notion of
negatively correlated frequency of relative rewards and the frequency of social interaction.
In general, the results point towards a negative correlation of social interaction and relative
rewards. This is in accordance with our model and our experimental results. In order
to maximize output, companies should minimize relative payment if they have a high
degree of social interaction and vice versa. On the other hand, we find a marginally
significant positive correlation of information and relative payment. This is contrary to
our experimental data. We find similar effects of information as social interaction to
the output level and the output difference. However, the effect of information in our
experiment is not as large as the effect of social interaction. It is not even significant for
the output level. So this unclear effect may be the reason why we do not find a negative
correlation of information and relative rewards in the IAB data.
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3.6 Conclusions
We conducted an experiment in order to find out which factors mainly drove the results
of the fruit picker experiments in Bandiera et al. (2005). In a relative payment scheme,
workers reduced their output level compared to a piece rate payment scheme. However,
this was only the case when picking a kind of fruit which allowed the workers to moni-
tor each other and interact socially. It was not clear whether information on the team
member’s output or social interaction among team members drove this result. In our ex-
periment we find that social interaction reduces the effort strongly compared to no social
interaction and no information. Information has a similar effect although not of the same
magnitude and not significantly. Information as well as social interaction reduced the
output difference of the workers in one team significantly and to the same extent. But
information and social interaction did not.
Our results speak in favor of designing work environments in a way that also regards
the nature of the respective payment scheme. Relative payments seem to work best in
the dimension of output if workers of one group cannot interact socially. So a certain
work environment (e.g. open office spaces) may naturally demand a certain payment
scheme. Vice versa it is possible that unchangeable payment schemes influence the work
environment.
Data taken from a questionnaire sent to more than 100 German establishments support
our findings. Relative rewards are uncommon in establishments with a high degree of
social interaction. However, relative rewards still exist in work environments with perfor-
mance information of fellow workers.
One has to bear in mind that the experimental results are only derived from short term
contracts for workers, who did not know each other. In Bandiera et al. (2005) the effect was
especially strong for befriended workers. So we believe that social ties would strengthen
our effects as well.
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3.7 Appendix
3.7.1 Input Mask
Figure 3.2: Input Mask
Notes: Going downwards and from left to right, the fields say “Logged Books”, “Logged Books of Your
Team Member” (only displayed in treatments with information), “Title and Subtitle”, “Author (Last
Name, First Name)”, “Further Authors (if existent)”, “Publisher”, “ISBN-Number (without “-”)”, “Pub-
lication Year”.
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3.7.2 Payment Handout
3.7.3 IAB Questionnaire
Figure 3.3: IAB Questionnaire, English Version, page 1
R01. a) Are there employees in your company whose salary depends on their relative performance data (i.e. on 
their work performance in comparison to the work performance of other employees in the same 
company)? 
Yes ………………….    No …………………. go to question R02! 
         b) What proportion of employees receives a salary which depends on their relative performance data? 
If precise data is not available please estimate. 
 Percentage of employees:       % 
 
R02. a) Are there employees in your company whose promotion opportunities depend on their relative 
performance data (i.e. on their performance in comparison to the performance other employees in the 
same company)? 
  Yes ………………….    No ………………….   go to question R03! 
b) What proportion of employees’ promotion opportunities depend on their relative performance data? If 
precise data is not available please estimate. 
 
Proportion of employees:    % 
 
R03. a) Are there employees in your company who are informed about the work performance of colleagues / 
others in similar positions? 
Yes ………………….     No ………………….   go to question R04! 
 
b) What proportion of employees is informed about the work performance of colleagues in similar positions? 
If precise data is not available please estimate. 
 
Percentage of employees:    % 
 
R04. How intensely do your employees interact socially, i.e. how often do they see each other and 
communicate with each other? 
  Never        Very often  
   _______ _______ _______ _______ 
         0          1          2         3         4 
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Figure 3.4: IAB Questionnaire, English Version, page 2
R05. a) What type of office structure is predominant in your company?  
One person (single/individual) office…………… 
Two person office……………………………………….. 
Group or team office…………………………………… 
Open plan office………………………………………….. 
Others…………………………………………………………. 
 
b) Are there shared communal multi-function zones for informal communication (e.g. coffee breaks) in your 
company? 
Yes ………………….   No …………………. 
 
R06.  How often do events for your employees (e.g. Christmas parties, ski trips, bowling nights etc.) take place in 
your company? Please rate using this scale! 
  Never        Very often 
   _______ _______ _______ _______ 
         0         1         2         3         4 
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